Ineficácia Militar Árabe

Ineficácia militar árabe

Os árabes são o povo que talvez mais consistentemente envolveu-se em conflitos armados e mais consistentemente sofreu derrotas. Nos conflitos modernos isso é uma constante. As vitórias, até o século X, devem-se muito mais ao fato de enfrentarem inimigos enfraquecidos e pelo seu conhecimento do deserto do que a qualquer outra coisa.

Um dos livros mais interessantes sobre história e estratégia militar que li nos últimos tempos busca responder esta questão. O livro é o "Arabs at War, Millitary Effectiveness, 1948-1991", Kenneth M. Pollack.

Desde a segunda guerra mundial, o Oriente Médio foi provavelmente a região mais conturbada, quase todos os conflitos com envolvimento dos árabes em alguma escala, e em todos eles a ineficácia surpreende. Alguém pode observar o histórico militar de Egito, Iraque, Arábia Saudita, Jordânia, Líbia e Síria, em combate com israelenses, europeus, americanos, persas, curdos, africanos, e até entre eles mesmos, e é sempre impressionante como atuam com ineficácia de maneira bem consistente, independente do adversário e das condições.

Dois exemplos extremos tanto em caso de vitória quanto derrota são a Síria na Guerra do Yom Kipur, e o Iraque no conflito com o Irã, e o final decisivo do conflito entre Líbia e Chade no norte do país em 1987-1988.

A ofensiva da Síria contra as forças israelenses no Golan em 1973 é comparável em disparidade à Operação Bagration pela URSS contra as tropas da Alemanha na Bielorússia durante a segunda guerra mundial. Um exército de veteranos defendendo linhas bem estabelecidas e fortificadas contra uma ofensiva massiva de surpresa com grande superioridade numérica. Os soviéticos tiveram sua maior vitória, enquanto os sírios tiveram sua pior derrota em condições de superioridade similares.

O Iraque passou praticamente uma década enfrentando o Irã com grande superioridade numérica e tecnológica, mas só conseguiu uma vitória em 1988 usando armas químicas em larga escala, matando cerca de 20,000 soldados iranianos, quase 1/5 das forças, e criando forças locais com disparidade de até 30 para 1 em relação aos iranianos.

No Chade, depois que os líbios perderam seu apoio entre os dissidentes chadianos, ainda contavam com decisiva vantagem numérica e tecnológica. Os chadianos não tinham tanques, blindados, aviões e artilharia, e não sabiam usar bem o pouco equipamento de infantaria que tinham. O único armamento pesado e transporte de que dispunham eram pick-ups Toyota com mísseis antitanque Milan fornecidos pela França na última hora, e confiavam na força aérea francesa e stingers fornecidos pelos EUA para defender-se dos líbios. Mesmo com a vantagem em todos os aspectos, os líbios sofreram uma derrota completa no norte do país. A principal base foi abandonada com muito equipamento ainda funcionando, soldados líbios morriam ao fugir pelos próprios campos minados, e a força aérea líbia tinha de destruir o próprio equipamento para evitar que fosse utilizado pelo inimigo.

Ou seja, independente do oponente e de vitória ou derrota, as forças árabes sempre atuam com muito menos eficácia do que esperado para seu número, equipamento e posição. Qual o real motivo disso?

Eu nunca havia pensado muito a fundo no assunto, e por conhecer melhor o conflito árabe-israelense, aceitava a explicação de cada guerra em particular, sem me preocupar muito nisso como característica dominante. Agora li um livro que trata especificamente do assunto, falando dos diversos conflitos e achei que valia a pena enumerar algumas das explicações que achei mais relevantes para discussão. Algumas das explicações auxiliam até a entender melhor outros conflitos.


1. O argumento mais óbvio é o treinamento das tropas. Alguns dos pontos dele são relevantes para outros argumentos. Como a maioria dos países árabes são monarquias e/ou ditaduras, a maior parte das forças armadas recebe um treinamento voltado para lidar mais com problemas internos, manifestações, tentativas de golpe e revoluções, do que uma operação militar convencional. Alguns analistas argumentam que o treinamento não é só inapropriado, mas inadequado mesmo. Na Guerra do Yom Kipur os egípcios treinaram por anos para fazer a mesma coisa, e fizeram bem feito quando era exatamente como esperava, mas não conseguiram fazer mais nada direito quando saiu dos planos.

2. Outro problema relacionado é que pelo fato da maioria desses países serem monarquias e/ou ditaduras muitos oficiais são apenas indicados, não chegando à posição por competência. Adicionalmente, por medo de um golpe de estado vindo dos militares, muitas indicações são feitas para deliberadamente gerar algum atrito e evitar uma união que levaria a isso. Esse atrito acaba indo para o campo de batalha também e elimina qualquer iniciativa. Soldados e oficiais preferem falhar do que tomar decisões por conta própria. Qualquer assunto militar é considerado segredo e oficiais são transferidos de forma imprevisível antes de poder formar alianças. Essa característica também presente na URSS acabou reforçada pelo envolvimento com os soviéticos pela maioria dos países árabes.


3. Isso gera um outro problema pois leva o conflito de classes que existe na sociedade para o campo de batalha, gerando hostilidades entreos homens . Para os homens de nível social baixo que ingressam nas forças armadas buscando oportunidades de ascenção social, um oficial indicado ao cargo representa uma ofensa. Pelo outro lado, a mesma discriminação social que haveria na sociedade civil acaba havendo entre o oficial indicado e seus homens. Isso é comum no Egito, onde há muitos relatos de oficiais que, sem nenhum laço com seus homens, simplesmente os abandonam no campo de batalha. Liderança não é considerada uma disciplina a ser aprendida, mas apenas assume-se que um oficial vindo de uma classe social superior seja um líder nato. O conflito entre oficiais também é constante por razões semelhantes, existindo uma disputa, e não há o mesmo grau de confiança que existe entre militares ocidentais.


4. A consequência mais óbvia desses três argumentos é a pouca coesão dos árabes em pequenas formações, a incapacidade de permanecer juntos e continuar a combater como grupo no calor da batalha, algo essencial na guerra moderna. Esse é o principal argumento que eu conhecia, porque é geralmente usado pelos militares israelenses. Desde a Campanha do Sinai em 1956, ficou claro para os israelenses como as unidades árabes perdiam sua coesão e deixavam cada homem por si ao sofrer ataques precisos e inesperados, algo que até ajudou a moldar a doutrina militar israelense a combater dessa forma.

5. Como muitos oficiais acabam chegando ao cargo por indicação, sem competência para tal, mesmo que permaneçam com as tropas, uma liderança tática rápida e eficiente é crucial para a eficácia nas guerras modernas, exigindo uma descentralização do comando e sub-oficiais competentes que consigam se adaptar com iniciativa e rapidamente às situações e conduzir tudo com fluidez. Isso é evidente em particular na Guerra do Yom Kippur, em que devido à surpresa adicional vê-se que tanto os Egípcios quanto Sírios lutaram com eficácia enquanto seguiam os planos originais, mas o nível despencou depois do ponto em que a reação israelense começou a ganhar momento e as decisões tinham que ser mais rápidas.


6. Outro ponto é a ineficácia dos árabes em adquirir informações sobre o inimigo e repassá-las eficientemente através da cadeia de comando. Não raro, em várias guerras, informações são deliberadamente distorcidas ou fabricadas para exagerar sucessos e ocultar falhas, principalmente por medo de represálias. Isso foi muito comum na guerra Irã-Iraque e na Guerra dos Seis Dias, chegando até mesmo ao topo da hierarquia. Difícil saber até onde foi fanfarronice e até onde foi falha de inteligência, mas por exemplo, a Jordânia chegou a lançar ataques fadados ao fracasso porque Egito anunciava que seus aviões já estavam bombardeando Tel Aviv quando na verdade foram destruídos no chão.


7. Muitos dos países árabes tem um nível educacional muito abaixo daquele dos países que lhes fornecem equipamento militar, e hoje as guerras dependem muito mais do conhecimento e manuseio eficaz dos equipamentos. Operar um tanque ou avião da segunda guerra mundial parece brincadeira de criança perto de todos os equipamentos computadorizados dos tanques e aviões modernos. Um argumento usado para explicar a ineficácia dos árabes em conflitos que dispõe de grande superioridade tecnológica, é não conhecer e explorar toda a capacidade dos equipamentos que dispõe devido às deficiências educacionais e ao treinamento inadequado. O nível de segredo e a paranóia constante que impera sobre todos os assuntos militares também impede a descentralização de manutenção e reparos de equipamentos, algo essencial nas guerras modernas.

Todos esses fatores, e outros que não foram comentados, culminam em uma esfera de ineficácia em todos os aspectos, desde o alto comando até o último soldado. Governantes impedem interação e treinamentos conjuntos entre as forças por medo de golpes, comandantes tentam microgerenciar qualquer aspecto das suas forças com medo de delegar autoridade, oficiais vêem soldados com desprezo e não se importam com eles e vice-versa.

Essas técnicas podem funcionar para manter uma ditadura, mas não para enfrentar um inimigo externo ou para sustentar uma democracia, daí a dificuldade em implantá-la nesses lugares.

Islam's Love-Hate Relationship with Homosexuality

Islam's Love-Hate Relationship with Homosexuality

By Serge Trifkovic
FrontPageMagazine.com | 1/24/2003



One in a series of excerpts adapted by Robert Locke from Dr. Serge Trifkovic’s new book

The Sword of the Prophet: A Politically-Incorrect Guide to Islam

“This sin, the impact of which makes one’s skin crawl, which words cannot describe, is evidence of perverted instincts, total collapse of shame and honor, and extreme filthiness of character and soul… The heavens, the Earth and the mountains tremble from the impact of this sin. The angels shudder as they anticipate the punishment of Allah to descend upon the people who commit this indescribable sin.” (1)

There are many sins in Islam that may fit this description, from idolatry, atheism, and apostasy, to drunkenness, adultery, and questioning the divine origin of the Koran. In this particular instance it refers to homosexuality, for which a death sentence remains on the statute books and is enforced in several Islamic countries.

In Saudi Arabia on April 16, 2001, five homosexuals were sentenced to 2,600 lashes and 6 years in prison, and four others to 2,400 lashes and 5 years’ imprisonment for “deviant sexual behavior.” Amnesty International subsequently reported that six men were executed on charges of deviant sexual behavior, some of which were related to their sexual orientation, but it was uncertain whether the six men who were executed were among the nine who were sentenced to flogging and imprisonment in April (2).

It is difficult to establish precisely the number of homosexuals that have been executed in Iran since the Islamic revolution in 1979, since not all sentences are widely publicized, but estimates range from several hundred to 4,000 (3). According to Amnesty International, at least three homosexual men and two lesbians were publicly beheaded in January 1990. The Islamic Penal Law Against Homosexuals, approved in July 1991 and ratified in November of that year, is simple. Article 110: “Punishment for sodomy is killing; the Sharia judge decides on how to carry out the killing.” Article 129: “Punishment for lesbianism is one hundred (100) lashes for each party.” Article 131: “If the act of lesbianism is repeated three times and punishment is enforced each time, the death sentence will be issued the fourth time.”

While the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, it regularly executed homosexuals. Islamic jurists in Kabul and Kandahar only differed on the method of killing. One group of scholars believed the condemned should be taken to the top of the highest building in the city and hurled to their deaths, while others advocated placing them in a pit next to a wall which was to be toppled on them, so that they are buried alive. Both methods were solidly grounded in authoritative tradition, and both were applied. At least five men convicted of sodomy by Afghanistan’s sharia courts had been “placed next to walls by Taliban officials and then buried under the rubble as the walls were toppled upon them.” In one such incident, three homosexuals were punished thus while Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar watched along with thousands of spectators. After the 30-minute waiting period, the three men were still alive, but two died the next day. What became of the third is unknown (4). The punishment by stoning is derived from the Koranic account of Sodom’s destruction by a “rain of stones,” which was itself the product of Mohammed’s misunderstanding of the Hebrew story of “fire and brimstone,” i.e. sulfur:

“We also (sent) Lut: he said to his people: “Do ye commit lewdness such as no people in creation (ever) committed before you? For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women: ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds.” And his people gave no answer but this: they said, “drive them out of your city: these are indeed men who want to be clean and pure!” But We saved him and his family, except his wife: she was of those who lagged behind. And We rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!” (5)

The Koranic claim that homosexuality was unknown before it first appeared in Sodom is a uniquely Islamic concept; so is the notion that its destruction was exclusively due to the homosexual practices of its inhabitants, a departure from the Hebrew Scriptures. In addition to the Koran many hadiths or authoritative traditional sayings mention liwat, (homosexual intercourse) e.g. “When a man mounts another man, the throne of God shakes,” and “Kill the one that is doing it and also kill the one that it is being done to (6).” Mohammed’s first successor Abu Bakr reportedly had a homosexual burned at the stake. The fourth caliph, Mohammed’s son-in-law Ali, ordered a sodomite thrown from the minaret of a mosque. Others he ordered to be stoned. One of the earliest and most authoritative commentators on the Koran, Ibn ‘Abbas (died 687) blended both approaches into a two-step execution in which “the sodomite should be thrown from the highest building in the town and then stoned.” Later it was decided that if no building were tall enough, the he could be shoved off a cliff. Regardless of the exact method,

“Moslem Jurists agree that, if proven of guilt, both of them should be killed. However, jurists differ on the methodology of capital punishment (7).”

There are seven countries in the world that carry the death penalty for homosexual acts, and all of them justify this punishment with sharia.

In Moslem nations, the suppression of liaison between men and women outside prearranged wedlock has produced frustrated sexual tension that has sought and found release in homosexual intercourse through the centuries. Those denied access to licit sexuality have sought and obtained outlets that have produced chronic contradiction between normative morality and social realities. Male and female prostitution and same-sex practices — including abuse of young boys by their older male relatives — have been rampant in Islamic societies from the medieval to the modern period. It should be emphasized that those societies stress a distinction between the sexual act itself, which was deemed acceptable, and emotional attachment, which was unpardonable:

“Sexual relations in Middle Eastern societies have historically articulated social hierarchies, that is, dominant and subordinate social positions: adult men on top; women, boys and slaves below (8).”

A Moslem who is the active partner in sexual relations with other men is not considered a “homosexual” (the word has no pre-modern Arabic equivalent); quite the contrary, his sexual domination of another man may even confer a status of hyper-masculinity. He may use other men as substitutes for women, and at the same time have great contempt for them. This depraved view of sex, common in mainstream Moslem societies, is commonly found in the West only in prisons. In all cases it is the presence of love, affection, or equality among sexual partners that is intolerable. Equality in sexual relations is unimaginable in Islam, whether heterosexual or homosexual. Sex in Islamic societies has never been about mutuality between partners, but about the adult male’s achievement of pleasure through domination.

Historically, this state of affairs was not concealed from Western observers who were fascinated, shocked, and often attracted by the outward appearances of rampant, barely concealed pederasty. By 1800, a European traveler to Egypt wrote:

“The inconceivable inclination which has dishonored the Greeks and Persians of antiquity constitutes the delight, or, more properly speaking the infamy of the Egyptians ... the contagion has seized the poor as well as the rich.”

The “contagion” in question was spelled out more bluntly by an earlier writer, Thomas Sherley, describing the Turks:

“For their Sodommerye they use it soe publiquely and impudentlye as an honest Christian woulde shame to companye his wyffe as they do with their buggeringe boys (9).”

A 17th century French visitor to the Middle East went so far as to claim that Moslems were bisexual by nature, and many male authors gave descriptions of “licentiousness” (lesbianism) among women in harems and bath houses. Homosexuality became known to the English as the “Persian” or “Turkish” vice.

This peculiar aspect of the Middle East has never entirely disappeared. The sight of men, even soldiers in uniform, strolling along a street hand in hand, strikes first-time visitors as extraordinary even today. The Moslem world enjoyed a reputation as a haven for sex with boys and men well into the twentieth century. The proclivities of many Western authors like Gustave Flaubert, Oscar Wilde, or Andre Gide, reflected the pederast and homosexual attractions of the Islamic world; the fascination continues in the “gay culture” of our own time:

But the bottom line - and it’s coming from a devout bottom - is that there’s still something extremely sensual and potent about the image of the Islamic male. You only have to compare the stiff, asexual frigidity of Bush and his bookmarmish wife with the moist-eyed, sensitive and soft-spoken quality of the bearded Bin Laden, feminine yet virile, with his multiple wives and vast progeny, to grasp the difference (10).

The author of this passage, a self-confessed promiscuous homosexual, has intuited something important, and dangerous. Excessively doting, downtrodden mothers fixated on their offspring, and aloof, mostly distant and domineering fathers, create preconditions for what is known in clinical psychology as the “lost object homosexuality,” as opposed to the pre-Oedipal polyformous homosexuality, which is “love for men.” The cry for the missing father, that emanates across the Moslem world into the endless void from a hundred thousand minarets five times each day, can never be answered. The hatred that motivates Bin Laden and his “feminine yet virile” followers is not the normal aggressiveness of the child for the father at the Oedipal stage, which can be mediated and managed, but hard-core psychotic homosexuality of the son abandoned by his father, a near-incurable condition that can lead to homicidal, delusional paranoia.

This condition is well known to the practitioners of clinical psychology and psychoanalysis in Great Britain, where thousands of sons of upper and upper-middle-class families end up in neo-Islamic establishments known as Public Schools. It is not too far-fetched to conclude that British Islamophilia under Disraeli and after was not merely due to the usual game of balancing the powers:

“I sometimes wonder if there is not some horrifying attraction, especially for English boys brought up in a public school, to the brutal manliness that regards sodomitic rape as an expression of virility. In any event, a series of Anglo-Saxon males who have gone in search of their manhood found it in Islamic culture: Sir Richard Burton, T.E. Lawrence, and Pasha Club are at the head of a large pack, whose rear is brought up by the academic camp-followers and foundation executives who find, in their defense of Islam, the excuse for their hatred of Jews (11).”

Men and women have been created different, and the recognition of those differences is essential in any society that does not want to follow the path of post-modern depravity. The denial of that difference is essential in the Faustian experiment to which the West is subjecting itself, and those who do not wish to partake in the proceedings may find Islam’s frank admission of difference between sexes alluring; but that is the lure of dementia as the cure for cancer. Islam has found the opposite extreme of the modern West’s bed-hopping unisex feminism, and has found it equally a source of opposite, though equally poisonous, pathologies. The traditional Western view, a balance between sexual equality and sexual difference, between freedom and restraint, is the best answer. Islam’s problem of homosexuality, a reflection of the deeper psychosis endemic to the Islamic world view, illustrates a problem that cannot be solved short of Islam’s thorough and comprehensive reform and revision.

Footnotes:

1. Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Fawzan, The Evil Sin of Homosexuality http://www.islamweb.net/english/family/sociaffair/socaff-84.html

2. Associated Press, April 16, 2001.

3. http://www.iranian.com/Letters/1999/September/gay.html

4. Amnesty International report, May 1998

5. 7:80-84

6. Further examples are listed at http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_isla.htm

7. http://www.jamaat.org/qa/homo.html

8. Bruce Dunne, “Power and Sexuality in the Middle East,” Middle East Report, Spring 1998.

9. Brian Whitaker in The Guardian, November 19, 2001 http://www.guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4302213,00.html

10. http://www.brucelabruce.com/Moslem/right.html

11. Th. Fleming, Chronicles (1999), op. cit.
Serge Trifkovic received his PhD from the University of Southampton in England and pursued postdoctoral research at the Hoover Institution at Stanford. His past journalistic outlets have included the BBC World Service, the Voice of America, CNN International, MSNBC, U.S. News & World Report, The Washington Times, the Philadelphia Inquirer, The Times of London, and the Cleveland Plain Dealer. He is foreign affairs editor of Chronicles.

Homosexuality on trial in Egypt
Same-sex relationships are as common in the Middle East as in Europe, but the difference is public perceptions, writes Brian Whitaker

* Brian Whitaker
* guardian.co.uk,
* Monday November 19 2001 13:51 GMT
* Article history

In 1800, a European traveller to Egypt wrote: "The inconceivable inclination which has dishonoured the Greeks and Persians of antiquity constitutes the delight, or, more properly speaking the infamy of the Egyptians ... the contagion has seized the poor as well as the rich."

The "contagion" in question was spelled out more bluntly by an earlier writer, Thomas Sherley, describing the Turks: "For their Sodommerye they use it soe publiquely and impudentlye as an honest Christian woulde shame to companye his wyffe as they do with their buggeringe boys".

A 17th century French visitor to the Middle East went so far as to claim that Muslims were bisexual by nature, and numerous male authors gave descriptions of "licentiousness" (i.e. lesbianism) among women in harems and bath houses that they could not possibly have witnessed.

In those days, homosexuality was known in Britain as the "Persian" or "Turkish" vice. That image of the Middle East has never entirely disappeared, and first-time visitors today are often struck by the sight of men, sometimes even soldiers in uniform, strolling along a street hand in hand.

The mistake here is to imagine that spoken language is the only gulf between cultures. Body language and customs also need translating if they are not to be misunderstood.

Confused signals can, of course, travel in both directions. A handbook issued to western students by the American University in Cairo warns: "Earrings on men are considered to be a sign of homosexuality".

A Jordanian (who had never visited Britain) once informed me that London is full of discos where "girlboys" dance together. Such behaviour, naturally, is known to many Arabs as the "English" vice.

The truth of the matter, so far as anyone really knows, is that same-sex relationships are neither more nor less common in the Middle East than anywhere else - though attitudes towards them differ.

Although Islam strongly disapproves of sex between men, Muslim societies have generally been tolerant in practice, especially where relationships are discreet. One of the most celebrated poets of classical Arabic literature indulged in wine and young men in equal quantities, but literary merit seems to have excused his behaviour.

The relatively open and liberal attitudes in much of the Arab world obviously came as a great shock to the straight-laced European travellers of the 18th and 19th centuries. The first people in Egypt to demand a law against homosexuality were the British, during the colonial period.

Curiously, though, over the last few decades, these positions have been reversed. Europe and North America have become more liberal towards homosexuality while some of the Arab countries have become more conservative - possibly in order to appease Islamic militants.

Last week, in the biggest gay trial that Egypt has ever seen, 23 men were sentenced to between one and five years' imprisonment for "debauchery" (since homosexuality itself is not illegal). Twenty-nine others, who had been held in jail for six months awaiting trial, were acquitted.

In advance of the trial, Egyptian newspapers published the full names and addresses of the accused - who included a university professor, three doctors and a lawyer - so there is little chance that those who were cleared will be able to return to a normal life.

The case began last May with a police raid on the Queen Boat, a floating disco on the Nile in Cairo, which was known as a gay - but not exclusively gay - venue. A number of women who inconveniently happened to be on board were allowed to go free.

Egypt's popular media reported the affair with a mixture of homophobia and xenophobia. Homosexuality, in their eyes, is a foreign phenomenon - an illness that Egyptians, if they are not careful, risk catching from westerners. Having caught it they may, in the words of one newspaper, go on to "infect others", thus threatening the Egyptian way of life.

It therefore came as no surprise that the central figure in the case, 32-year-old Sherif Farahat, was said to have been a regular visitor to the gay fleshpots of Europe and - adding a touch of regional politics - Israel.

To highlight the danger to the nation, the case was not heard in an ordinary court but in the state security court, specially set up some years ago to deal with suspected terrorists. The front-page headline of a Cairo newspaper reinforced this view: "Perverts declare war on Egypt".

Although novels by famous Egyptian writers such as Nobel Prize winner Naguib Mahfouz, and several films, portray gay characters living normally in society and causing no public outcry, it has never been easy to be gay in Egypt. In poor areas, men who seem feminine or act in a camp manner are ridiculed and sometimes beaten.

Gay characters in modern Arab novels and films usually meet with unhappiness or tragedy. Their sexual relationships with foreigners are often a metaphor for western domination or Arab revenge against it.

One popular explanation for same-sex relationships among young people in the Middle East is that those involved are not really gay, but social insistence on the virginity of unmarried women drives them to seek other outlets.

This is simply not true, according to one Egyptian gay activist who asked to be known only as Ahmed. "Heterosexual sex is freely available," he said. "Women who need to be virgins can have an operation to restore their virginity before they marry. It's very simple and quite cheap." (The cost is normally less than £200.)

It is much more common, he said, for gay young men to be forced into marriages they do not want. Those who display the wrong inclinations are likely to be beaten by their fathers until they find a wife or run away from home. In better-off families they may be sent for a "cure".

Ahmed told of a friend whose father discovered he was having a gay relationship and, after a beating, bundled him off to a psychiatrist.

"The treatment involved showing him pictures of men and women and giving him electric shocks if he looked at the men," Ahmed said. "After a few weeks of this he persuaded a woman to pretend to be his girlfriend. His father was happy for a while - until he found a text message from the boyfriend on his son's mobile phone."

The beatings started again and the young man fled to the United States.

No one is absolutely sure what prompted the recent mass trial in Cairo, but it seems that the internet played a part.

While discreet gay relationships are tolerated in Egypt up to a point, concepts such as "gay identity" and "gay lifestyle" are not recognised. There has never been a "gay community" of the kind found in many western cities.

This began to change in Egypt with the arrival of the internet. Websites and email lists allowed previously isolated gays to make contact and tell each other about social events.

About the same time, the Egyptian police set up a special internet crimes unit. With internet use mainly confined to the country's law-abiding middle classes, there was little real work for them to do, but they needed to show results and spotted a few international dating sites where Egyptian men were seeking to meet other men.

"Some found themselves invited out for a date and got arrested when they turned up," one man said. In February, a computer engineer was jailed for 15 months and an accountant for three months for having committed a "scandalous act" - advertising sexual services on the web.

Many Egyptian gays believe the government has cracked down because they were starting to come into the open. Ahmed Ghanem, a western-educated film director, says that the internet made it easier to find gay hangouts, and many upper-class gays no longer felt a need to hide.

"This has led to a negative reaction among ordinary Egyptians who do not believe that sex is something to speak about in public," he says.

Meanwhile, half a dozen Egyptian gay websites have closed down, leaving only gayegypt.com, which is registered in London and uses a server in California. It carries a warning on its home page that visitors may be monitored by the Egyptian authorities.

The gay emailing lists, in turn, have been deluged with "unsubscribe" messages. Since the arrests, one has dropped from 300 subscribers to nine (of whom only six are Egyptians).

· Thanks to Khaled Dawoud, the Guardian's correspondent in Cairo, for assistance with this article.

Email
brian.whitaker@guardian.co.uk


Why are the Turks obsessed with homosexuality? It seems that's all they talk about. Is it because their culture is drenched in it? The funny thing however is that the Turks on here seem to be in denial(as usual)about this aspect of their history too.

...hamams/men bathing other men, tellaks, Turkish Prisons and all those young boy references in Islam. etc etc etc.

http://www.qrd.org/qrd/www/world/europe/turkey/guide.htm

http://www.thewe.cc/thewei/&/direland/turkey_gay_paintiing_1.jpe

"The sexual doings of the Turks came under frequent criticism by their Christian neighbors. The Chronicles of the Moldavian Land mention that the Ottomans upon the sack of Crimea in 1475, sailed away with a galleon filled with one hundred and fifty young boys destined for "the filthy sodomy of the whoring Turk." Thomas Sherley, held captive by the Ottomans between 1603 and 1605 under harsh circumstances, reported in his Discourse of the Turks that "For their Sodommerye they use it soe publiquely and impudentlye as an honest Christian woulde shame to companye his wyffe as they do with their buggeringe boys." John Cam Hobhouse an early traveller to Istanbul with his friend Lord Byron described the köçek dances as "beastly" and the anonymous poem Don Leon (written in the voice of Byron and ascribed to him by some), referred to Turkish boy prostitution as a "monstrous scene." Osman Agha of Temeşvar who fell captive to the Austrians in 1688 wrote in his memoirs that one night an Austrian boy approached him for sex, telling him "for I know all Turks are pederasts".[20]
"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pederasty_in_the_Middle_East

The Truth about Islamic Crusades and Imperialism

By James Arlandson

Historical facts say that Islam has been imperialistic—and would still like to be, if only for religious reasons. Many Muslim clerics, scholars, and activists, for example, would like to impose Islamic law around the world. Historical facts say that Islam, including Muhammad, launched their own Crusades against Christianity long before the European Crusades.

Today, Muslim polemicists and missionaries, who believe that Islam is the best religion in the world, claim that the West has stolen Islamic lands and that the West (alone) is imperialistic.One hardline Muslim emailer to me said about the developed West and the undeveloped Islamic countries: 'You stole our lands' and then he held his finger on the exclamation key to produce a long string of them.

Thus imperialism, a word that has reached metaphysical levels and that is supposed to stop all debates and answer all questions, explains why Islamic countries have not kept up with the West. The emailer did not look inwardly, as if his own culture and religion may play a role. Instead, it is always the West's fault.

Westerners—even academics—accept the notion that the West alone was aggressive. It seems that Islam is always innocent and passive. It is difficult to uncover the source of this Western self—loathing. It is, however, a pathology that seems to strike Westerners more than other people around the globe. This anti—West pathology shows up in Westerners' hatred for the European Crusades in the Medieval Age.

It must be admitted that there is much to dislike about the European Crusades. If they are contrasted with the mission and ministry of Jesus and the first generations of Christians, then the Crusades do not look so good. But did the Europeans launch the first Crusade in a mindless, bloodthirsty and irrational way, or were there more pressing reasons? Were they the only ones to be militant?

The purpose of this article is not to justify or defend European Crusades, but to explain them, in part—though scholarship can go a long way to defend and justify them

In this article, the word 'crusade' (derived from the Latin word for 'cross') in an Islamic context means a holy war or jihad. It is used as a counterweight to the Muslim accusation that only the Europeans launched crusades. Muslims seem to forget that they had their own, for several centuries before the Europeans launched theirs as a defense against the Islamic expansion.

We will employ a partial timeline spanning up to the first European response to Islamic imperialism, when Pope Urban II launched his own Crusade in 1095. The timeline mostly stays within the parameters of the Greater Middle East. The data in bold print are of special interest for revealing early Islamic atrocities, their belief in heroism in warfare, or politics today.

The Islamic Crusades were very successful. The Byzantines and Persian Empires had worn themselves out with fighting, so a power vacuum existed. Into this vacuum stormed Islam.

After the timeline, two questions are posed, which are answered at length

The Timeline

630 Two years before Muhammad's death of a fever, he launches the Tabuk Crusades, in which he led 30,000 jihadists against the Byzantine Christians. He had heard a report that a huge army had amassed to attack Arabia, but the report turned out to be a false rumor. The Byzantine army never materialized. He turned around and went home, but not before extracting 'agreements' from northern tribes. They could enjoy the 'privilege' of living under Islamic 'protection' (read: not be attacked by Islam), if they paid a tax (jizya).

This tax sets the stage for Muhammad's and the later Caliphs' policies. If the attacked city or region did not want to convert to Islam, then they paid a jizya tax. If they converted, then they paid a zakat tax. Either way, money flowed back to the Islamic treasury in Arabia or to the local Muslim governor.

632—634 Under the Caliphate of Abu Bakr the Muslim Crusaders reconquer and sometimes conquer for the first time the polytheists of Arabia. These Arab polytheists had to convert to Islam or die. They did not have the choice of remaining in their faith and paying a tax. Islam does not allow for religious freedom.

633 The Muslim Crusaders, led by Khalid al—Walid, a superior but bloodthirsty military commander, whom Muhammad nicknamed the Sword of Allah for his ferocity in battle (Tabari, 8:158 / 1616—17), conquer the city of Ullays along the Euphrates River (in today's Iraq). Khalid captures and beheads so many that a nearby canal, into which the blood flowed, was called Blood Canal (Tabari 11:24 / 2034—35).

634 At the Battle of Yarmuk in Syria the Muslim Crusaders defeat the Byzantines. Today Osama bin Laden draws inspiration from the defeat, and especially from an anecdote about Khalid al—Walid. An unnamed Muslim remarks: 'The Romans are so numerous and the Muslims so few.' To this Khalid retorts: 'How few are the Romans, and how many the Muslims! Armies become numerous only with victory and few only with defeat, not by the number of men. By God, I would love it . . . if the enemy were twice as many' (Tabari, 11:94 / 2095). Osama bin Ladin quotes Khalid and says that his fighters love death more than we in the West love life. This philosophy of death probably comes from a verse like Sura 2:96. Muhammad assesses the Jews: '[Prophet], you are sure to find them [the Jews] clinging to life more eagerly than any other people, even polytheists' (MAS Abdel Haleem, The Qur'an, Oxford UP, 2004; first insertion in brackets is Haleem's; the second mine).

634—644 The Caliphate of Umar ibn al—Khattab, who is regarded as particularly brutal.

635 Muslim Crusaders besiege and conquer of Damascus

636 Muslim Crusaders defeat Byzantines decisively at Battle of Yarmuk.

637 Muslim Crusaders conquer Iraq at the Battle of al—Qadisiyyah (some date it in 635 or 636)

638 Muslim Crusaders conquer and annex Jerusalem, taking it from the Byzantines.

638—650 Muslim Crusaders conquer Iran, except along Caspian Sea.

639—642 Muslim Crusaders conquer Egypt.

641 Muslim Crusaders control Syria and Palestine.

643—707 Muslim Crusaders conquer North Africa.

644 Caliph Umar is assassinated by a Persian prisoner of war; Uthman ibn Affan is elected third Caliph, who is regarded by many Muslims as gentler than Umar.

644—650 Muslim Crusaders conquer Cyprus, Tripoli in North Africa, and establish Islamic rule in Iran, Afghanistan, and Sind.

656 Caliph Uthman is assassinated by disgruntled Muslim soldiers; Ali ibn Abi Talib, son—in—law and cousin to Muhammad, who married the prophet's daughter Fatima through his first wife Khadija, is set up as Caliph.

656 Battle of the Camel, in which Aisha, Muhammad's wife, leads a rebellion against Ali for not avenging Uthman's assassination. Ali's partisans win.

657 Battle of Siffin between Ali and Muslim governor of Jerusalem, arbitration goes against Ali

661 Murder of Ali by an extremist; Ali's supporters acclaim his son Hasan as next Caliph, but he comes to an agreement with Muawiyyah I and retires to Medina.

661—680 the Caliphate of Muawiyyah I. He founds Umayyid dynasty and moves capital from Medina to Damascus

673—678 Arabs besiege Constantinople, capital of Byzantine Empire

680 Massacre of Hussein (Muhammad's grandson), his family, and his supporters in Karbala, Iraq.

691 Dome of the Rock is completed in Jerusalem, only six decades after Muhammad's death.

705 Abd al—Malik restores Umayyad rule.

710—713 Muslim Crusaders conquer the lower Indus Valley.

711—713 Muslim Crusaders conquer Spain and impose the kingdom of Andalus. This article recounts how Muslims today still grieve over their expulsion 700 years later. They seem to believe that the land belonged to them in the first place.

719 Cordova, Spain, becomes seat of Arab governor

732 The Muslim Crusaders stopped at the Battle of Poitiers; that is, Franks (France) halt Arab advance

749 The Abbasids conquer Kufah and overthrow Umayyids

756 Foundation of Umayyid amirate in Cordova, Spain, setting up an independent kingdom from Abbasids

762 Foundation of Baghdad

785 Foundation of the Great Mosque of Cordova

789 Rise of Idrisid amirs (Muslim Crusaders) in Morocco; foundation of Fez; Christoforos, a Muslim who converted to Christianity, is executed.

800 Autonomous Aghlabid dynasty (Muslim Crusaders) in Tunisia

807 Caliph Harun al—Rashid orders the destruction of non—Muslim prayer houses and of the church of Mary Magdalene in Jerusalem

809 Aghlabids (Muslim Crusaders) conquer Sardinia, Italy

813 Christians in Palestine are attacked; many flee the country

831 Muslim Crusaders capture Palermo, Italy; raids in Southern Italy

850 Caliph al—Matawakkil orders the destruction of non—Muslim houses of prayer

855 Revolt of the Christians of Hims (Syria)

837—901 Aghlabids (Muslim Crusaders) conquer Sicily, raid Corsica, Italy, France

869—883 Revolt of black slaves in Iraq

909 Rise of the Fatimid Caliphate in Tunisia; these Muslim Crusaders occupy Sicily, Sardinia

928—969 Byzantine military revival, they retake old territories, such as Cyprus (964) and Tarsus (969)

937 The Ikhshid, a particularly harsh Muslim ruler, writes to Emperor Romanus, boasting of his control over the holy places

937 The Church of the Resurrection (known as Church of Holy Sepulcher in Latin West) is burned down by Muslims; more churches in Jerusalem are attacked

960 Conversion of Qarakhanid Turks to Islam

966 Anti—Christian riots in Jerusalem

969 Fatimids (Muslim Crusaders) conquer Egypt and found Cairo

c. 970 Seljuks enter conquered Islamic territories from the East

973 Israel and southern Syria are again conquered by the Fatimids

1003 First persecutions by al—Hakim; the Church of St. Mark in Fustat, Egypt, is destroyed

1009 Destruction of the Church of the Resurrection by al—Hakim (see 937)

1012 Beginning of al—Hakim's oppressive decrees against Jews and Christians

1015 Earthquake in Palestine; the dome of the Dome of the Rock collapses

1031 Collapse of Umayyid Caliphate and establishment of 15 minor independent dynasties throughout Muslim Andalus

1048 Reconstruction of the Church of the Resurrection completed

1050 Creation of Almoravid (Muslim Crusaders) movement in Mauretania; Almoravids (aka Murabitun) are coalition of western Saharan Berbers; followers of Islam, focusing on the Quran, the hadith, and Maliki law.

1055 Seljuk Prince Tughrul enters Baghdad, consolidation of the Seljuk Sultanate

1055 Confiscation of property of Church of the Resurrection

1071 Battle of Manzikert, Seljuk Turks (Muslim Crusaders) defeat Byzantines and occupy much of Anatolia

1071 Turks (Muslim Crusaders) invade Palestine

1073 Conquest of Jerusalem by Turks (Muslim Crusaders)

1075 Seljuks (Muslim Crusaders) capture Nicea (Iznik) and make it their capital in Anatolia

1076 Almoravids (Muslim Crusaders) (see 1050) conquer western Ghana

1085 Toledo is taken back by Christian armies

1086 Almoravids (Muslim Crusaders) (see 1050) send help to Andalus, Battle of Zallaca

1090—1091 Almoravids (Muslim Crusaders) occupy all of Andalus except Saragossa and Balearic Islands

1094 Byzantine emperor Alexius Comnenus I asks western Christendom for help against Seljuk invasions of his territory; Seljuks are Muslim Turkish family of eastern origins; see 970

1095 Pope Urban II preaches first Crusade; they capture Jerusalem in 1099

So it is only after all of the Islamic aggressive invasions that Western Christendom launches its first Crusades.

It could be argued that sometimes the Byzantine and Western European leaders did not behave exemplarily, so a timeline on that subject could be developed. And sometimes the Muslims behaved exemplarily. Both are true. However, the goal of this timeline is to balance out the picture more clearly. Many people regard Islam as an innocent victim, and the Byzantines and Europeans as bullies. This was not always the case.

Moreover, we should take a step back and look at the big picture. If Islam had stayed in Arabia and had not waged wars of conquest, then no troubles would have erupted. But the truth is this: Islam moved aggressively during the Caliphates of Abu Bakr and Umar in the seventh century, with other Caliphs continuing well beyond that; only then did the Western Europeans react (see 1094).

It must be noted that Islamic expansion continues until well into the seventeenth century. For example, the Muslims Crusaders conquer Constantinople in 1453 and unsuccessfully besiege Vienna for the second time in 1683 (earlier in 1529). By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Islamic Crusades receded, due to Western resistance. Since that time until the present, Islamic civilization has not advanced very far.

Two questions are posed and then answered at length.

Besides following Muhammad, why else did the Muslims launch their Crusades out of Arabia in the first place?

It is only natural to ask why Islam launched its own Crusades long before Christendom did.

In the complicated Muslim Crusades that lasted several centuries before the European Crusades, it is difficult to come up with a grand single theory as to what launched these Crusades. Because of this difficulty, we let three scholars and two eyewitness participants analyze the motives of the early Islamic Crusades.

1. World religious conquest

Muslim polemicists like Sayyid Qutb assert that Islam's mission is to correct the injustices of the world. What he has in mind is that if Islam does not control a society, then injustice dominates it, ipso facto. But if Islam dominates it, then justice rules it (In the Shade of the Qur'an, vol. 7, pp. 8—15). Islam is expansionist and must conquer the whole world to express Allah's perfect will on this planet, so Qutb and other Muslims believe.

2. 'Unruly' energies in Arabia?

Karen Armstrong, a former nun and well—spoken, prolific author and apologist for Islam, comes up short of a satisfactory justification for the Muslim Crusades:

Once [Abu Bakr] crushed the rebellion [against Islamic rule within Arabia], Abu Bakr may well have decided to alleviate internal tensions by employing the unruly energies within the ummah [Muslim community] against external foes. Whatever the case, in 633 Muslim armies began a new series of campaigns in Persia, Syria and Iraq. (Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths, New York: Ballantine, 1997, p. 226).

Armstrong also notes that the 'external foes' to Islam in Arabia in 633 are the Persians and the Byzantines, but they are too exhausted after years of fighting each other to pose a serious threat to Islam. Therefore, it moved into a 'power vacuum,' unprovoked (Armstrong p. 227). She simply does not know with certainty why Muslims marched northward out of Arabia.

3. Religion, economy, and political control

Fred M. Donner, the dean of historians specializing in the early Islamic conquests, cites three large factors for the Islamic Crusades. First, the ideological message of Islam itself triggered the Muslim ruling elite simply to follow Muhammad and his conquests; Islam had a divinely ordained mission to conquer in the name of Allah. (The Early Islamic Conquests, Princeton UP, 1981, p. 270). The second factor is economic. The ruling elite 'wanted to expand the political boundaries of the new state in order to secure even more fully than before the trans—Arab commerce they had plied for a century or more' (p. 270). The final factor is political control. The rulers wanted to maintain their top place in the new political hierarchy by having aggressive Arab tribes migrate into newly conquered territories (p. 271).

Thus, these reasons they have nothing to do with just wars of self—defense. Early Islam was merely being aggressive without sufficient provocation from the surrounding Byzantine and Persian Empires.

4. Sheer thrill of conquest and martyrdom

Khalid al—Walid (d. 642), a bloodthirsty but superior commander of the Muslim armies at the time, also answers the question as to why the Muslims stormed out of Arabia, in his terms of surrender set down to the governor of al—Hirah, a city along the Euphrates River in Iraq. He is sent to call people to Islam or pay a 'protection' tax for the 'privilege' of living under Islamic rule (read: not to be attacked again) as dhimmis or second—class citizens. Says Khalid:

'I call you to God and to Islam. If you respond to the call, you are Muslims: You obtain the benefits they enjoy and take up the responsibilities they bear. If you refuse, then [you must pay] the jizyah. If you refuse the jizyah, I will bring against you tribes of people who are more eager for death than you are for life. We will fight you until God decides between us and you.' (Tabari, The Challenge to the Empires, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship, NY: SUNYP, 1993, vol. 11, p. 4; Arabic page 2017)

Thus, according to Khalid, religion is early Islam's primary motive (though not the only one) of conquering people.

In a short sermon, Abu Bakr says:

. . . Indeed, the reward in God's book for jihad in God's path is something for which a Muslim should love to be singled out, by which God saved [people] from humiliation, and through which He has bestowed nobility in this world and the next. (Tabari 11:80 / 2083—84)

Thus, the Caliph repeats the Quran's trade of this life for the next, in an economic bargain and in the context of jihad (cf. Suras 4:74; 9:111 and 61:10—13). This offer of martyrdom, agreeing with Donner's first factor, religious motivation, is enough to get young Muslims to sign up for and to launch their Crusades out of Arabia in the seventh century.

Khalid also says that if some do not convert or pay the tax, then they must fight an army that loves death as other people love life (see 634).

5. Improvement of life over that in Arabia

But improvement of life materially must be included in this not—so—holy call. When Khalid perceived that his Muslim Crusaders desired to return to Arabia, he pointed out how luscious the land of the Persians was:

'Do you not regard [your] food like a dusty gulch? By God, if struggle for God's sake and calling [people] to God were not required of us, and there were no consideration except our livelihood, the wise opinion would [still] have been to strike this countryside until we possess it'. . . . (Tabari 11:20 / 2031)

Khalid was from Mecca. At the time of this 'motivational' speech, the Empire of Persia included Iraq, and this is where Khalid is warring. Besides his religious goal of Islamizing its inhabitants by warfare, Khalid's goal is to 'possess' the land.

Like Pope Urban II in 1095 exhorting the Medieval Crusaders to war against the Muslim 'infidels' for the first time, in response to Muslim aggression that had been going on for centuries, Abu Bakr gives his own speech in 634, exhorting Muslims to war against the 'infidels,' though he is not as long—winded as the Pope.

Muslim polemicists believe that Islam spread militarily by a miracle from Allah. However, these five earth—bound reasons explain things more clearly.

Did the Islamic Crusades force conversions by the sword?

Historical facts demonstrate that most of the conquered cities and regions accepted the last of three options that were enforced by the later Muslim Crusaders: (1) fight and die, (2) convert and pay the zakat tax; (3) keep their Biblical faith and pay the jizya tax. Most preferred to remain in their own religion.

However, people eventually converted. After all, Islamic lands are called such for a reason—or many reasons. Why? Four Muslim polemicists whitewash the reasons people converted, so their scholarship is suspect.

1. The polemical answer

First, Malise Ruthven and Azim Nanji use the Quran to explain later historical facts:

'Islam expanded by conquest and conversion. Although it was sometimes said that the faith of Islam was spread by the sword, the two are not the same. The Koran states unequivocally, 'There is no compulsion in religion' (Sura 2:256).' (Historical Atlas of Islam, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 2004, 30).

According to them, the Quran says there should be no compulsion, so the historical facts conform to a sacred text. This shaky reasoning is analyzed, below.

Next, David Dakake also references Sura 2:256, and defines compulsion very narrowly. Jihad has been misrepresented as forcing Jews, Christians, and other peoples of the Middle East, Asia and Africa to convert to Islam 'on pain of death.' ('The Myth of Militant Islam,' Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, ed. J.E.B. Lumbard, Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2004, p. 13). This is too narrow a definition of compulsion, as we shall see, below.

Finally, Qutb, also citing Sura 2:256, is even more categorical:

'Never in its history did Islam compel a single human being to change his faith' (In the Shade of the Qur'an, vol. 8, p. 307).

This is absurd on its face, and it only demonstrates the tendentiousness of Islamic scholarship, which must be challenged at every turn here in the West. For more information and thorough logic, see this article.

2. The historical facts

History does not always follow Scriptures because people do not. Did the vast majority of conquered peoples make such fine distinctions, even if a general amnesty were granted to People of the Book? Maybe a few diehards did, but the majority? Most people at this time did not know how to read or could barely read, so when they saw a Muslim army outside their gates, why would they not convert, even if they waited? To Ruthven's and Nanji's credit, they come up with other reasons to convert besides the sword, such as people's fatigue with church squabbles, a few doctrinal similarities, simplicity of the conversion process, a desire to enter the ranks of the new ruling elite, and so on. But using the Quran to interpret later facts paints the history of Islam into a corner of an unrealistically high standard.

This misguided connection between Scripture and later historical facts does not hold together. Revelations or ideals should not run roughshod over later historical facts, as if all followers obey their Scriptures perfectly.

To his credit, Ibn Khaldun (1332—1406), late Medieval statesman, jurist, historian, and scholar, has enough integrity and candor to balance out these four Muslim apologists, writing a history that is still admired by historians today. He states the obvious:

In the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the Muslim mission and (the obligation to) convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force. (The Muqaddimah: an Introduction to History (abridged), trans. Franz Rosenthal, Princeton UP, 1967, p.183)

When the Islamic Crusaders go out to conquer, carrying an Islamic banner inscribed in Arabic of the glory and the truth of their prophet, Ibn Khaldun would not deny that the army's mission, besides the material reasons of conquest, is to convert the inhabitants. Islam is a 'universalizing' religion, and if its converts enter its fold either by persuasion or force, then that is the nature of Islam.

Moreover, Ibn Khaldun explains why a dynasty rarely establishes itself firmly in lands of many different tribes and groups. But it can be done after a long time and employing the following tactics, as seen in the Maghrib (N and NW Africa) from the beginning of Islam to Ibn Khaldun's own time:

The first (Muslim) victory over them and the European Christians (in the Maghrib) was of no avail. They continued to rebel and apostatized time after time. The Muslims massacred many of them. After the Muslim religion had been established among them, they went on revolting and seceding, and they adopted dissident religious opinions many times. They remained disobedient and unmanageable . . . . Therefore, it has taken the Arabs a long time to establish their dynasty in the . . . Maghrib. (p. 131)

Conclusion

Though European Crusaders may have been sincere, they wandered off from the origins of Christianity when they slashed and burned and forced conversions. Jesus never used violence; neither did he call his disciples to use it. Given this historical fact, it is only natural that the New Testament would never endorse violence to spread the word of the true God. Textual reality matches historical reality in the time of Jesus.

In contrast, Muslims who slashed and burned and forced conversions did not wander off from the origins of Islam, but followed it closely. It is a plain and unpleasant historical fact that in the ten years that Muhammad lived in Medina (622—632), he either sent out or went out on seventy—four raids, expeditions, or full—scale wars, which range from small assassination hit squads to the Tabuk Crusade, described above (see 630). Sometimes the expeditions did not result in violence, but a Muslim army always lurked in the background. Muhammad could exact a terrible vengeance on an individual or tribe that double—crossed him. These ten years did not know long stretches of peace.

It is only natural that the Quran would be filled with references to jihad and qital, the latter word meaning only fighting, killing, warring, and slaughtering. Textual reality matches historical reality in the time of Muhammad. And after.

But this means that the Church had to fight back or be swallowed up by an aggressive religion over the centuries. Thus, the Church did not go out and conquer in a mindless, bloodthirsty, and irrational way—though the Christian Crusades were far from perfect.

Islam was the aggressor in its own Crusades, long before the Europeans responded with their own.

James Arlandson can be reached at jamesmarlandson@hotmail.com

Supplemental Material

Please see this two—part article (here and here) for the rules of Islamic warfare. Too often they do not follow simple justice, but were barbaric and cruel, such as permitting sex with newly captured female prisoners of war.

This article goes into more detail on the motives for Islamic expansion and a comparison with Christianity. The second major section discusses the weak Islamic claim on Jerusalem.

This book by Andrew Bostom is the antidote to the false belief that life under Islam was always a bed of roses. Bostom provides many source documents, sometimes translated for the first time. Here are some online samples. This two—part article (here and here) recounts Muslim atrocities in Palestine. This two—part article (here and here) demonstrates that jihad produced the European Crusades.

References

Gil, Moshe. A History of Palestine: 634—1099. Cambridge UP, 1983, 1997.

Nicolle, David. The Armies of Islam. Men—at—Arms. Osprey, 1982.

———. Saladin and the Saracens. Men—at Arms. Osprey, 1986.

———. Armies of the Muslim Conquests. Men—at—Arms. Osprey, 1993.

———. The Moors, the Islamic West. Men—at—Arms. Osprey, 2001.

The Stages of Islamic Expansion

The Stages of Islamic Expansion

Islamist Tactics In Non-Islamic Societies

The following is not based on conjecture or opinion, but rather, on the empirical modus operandi evidence of 1300 years of Islamic history.

Introduction:

The goal of Islamism is the conversion or subjugation of the entire world through the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate and the eradication of all non-Islamic cultures, religions, traditions, and ways of life. This goal is non-negotiable in the eyes of true Muslims.
Islamists will not stop their assault (overt or covert) on the non-Muslim world till they have achieved their divinely prescribed goal.

They believe that the end always justifies the means: Islamists have no respect or regard for the rules, laws, or values of the non-Islamic world, to them, only the precepts propounded in the Koran are legitimate. Only after they have expunged all things un-Islamic from the world, will Allah�s design for humanity be as he intended. Islamists consider treaties with unbelievers to be non-binding. When in non-Muslim countries they will say or do whatever is necessary to obscure their true intentions of eventual domination of the entire world.

When considering Islam, always look at what they do, not what they say. Lying, treachery and deception have traditionally been the Islamists' key tactics of choice in their jihad of conquest. This tactic �al taqiyya in Arabic, or religious deception� is a common practice in Islam.

The methods used by Muhammad, Islam�s founder, are always the template for Muslim conduct.

It is irrelevant whether you acknowledge, reject or ignore this harsh reality, what the Islamists have described as �The Third Great Jihad� is underway, and either you, your children, or grandchildren, will inevitably face its truth.

Stages of Islamisation

STAGE ONE:

INFILTRATION

• Initial migration wave to non-Muslim country.
• Maintain a low profile while few in numbers and lacking in power.
• Appeal for humanitarian tolerance from the non-Muslim populace of the host country.
• Profess tolerance for others and their beliefs. Establish �interfaith dialogue��heavily weighted toward a pro-Islamic emphasis. Stress Islam�s common �Abrahamic links� with Judaism and Christianity.
• Strive incessantly to portray Islam as a peaceful religion and Muslims as misunderstood victims of Islamophobic racism.
• When dealing with the media, or in inter-personal relations, use images of women and children to portray Islam in a gentle, positive, non threatening light.
• Establish mosques and cultural centres as power bases and safe havens for recruitment and covert subversive projects. (These are funded by the oil revenue of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states).
• Muslim clerics and community leaders actively promote a high Muslim birthrate in target society to increase locally-born Muslim demographic.
• Misrepresent the true intentions or aims as a cover for clandestine operations, and deny any hidden agenda, future supremacist ambitions, or connection with radicalism.
  
  
  

STAGE TWO:

CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

� Proselytising efforts initiated. (daw�ah)

� Facilitate the establishment of, and recruitment for, secretive fundamentalist cells. ( Hizb ut Tahrir, Muslim Brotherhood, Jemaah Islamiya etc.)

� Demand that special social, cultural and religious dispensations and exceptions be made for Muslims.

� Strive to convert to Islam those non-Muslims in the host society who are alienated, disillusioned or marginalized.

� Revisionist efforts to rewrite world history in favour of Islam.

� Deny all evidence of negative, incriminating historical sources that reveal the true nature and methods of Islamic expansion.

� Use psychological propagandist Jihad to discredit and deprecate non-Muslim history and culture by mounting a critical assault on cultural values and icons of the non-Muslim world, such as democracy, man-made law and science. Increase dissemination of anti-western propaganda and initiate anti-western psychological warfare.

� Make a concerted effort to recruit, or second, allies who share similar anti-Western goals (Communists, socialists, multiculturalists, anti-globalism activists, anarchists).

� Form alliances with the enemies of Western society particularly �progressives�, cultural relativists, anti capitalism leftists. "The enemy of my enemy is my friend"

� Attempt to indoctrinate children to Islamist viewpoint by infiltrating education system using na�ve and sympathetic leftist teachers. Form Islamic student bodies on university campuses to propagate pro-Islamic points of view among tomorrow�s leaders.

� Increase efforts to intimidate, silence and discredit critical Muslim apostates and non-Muslim secularists, intellectuals and polemicists.

� Strongly advocate the need to introduce vilification and blasphemy laws into the host society�s statutes in order to silence and intimidate critics.

� Continued focus on enlarging Muslim population by increasing Muslim births and promoting Muslim immigration to dilute the non-Muslim demographic.

� Use first and second generation Muslim citizens as activist foot soldiers and public frontmen and repeatedly stress their native-born status to the media.

� Use charities to recruit supporters.

� Use the proceeds of crime and fraud to obtain funds to finance activities.

� Use covert methods to divide, destabilise, and eventually destroy the host society from within.

� Develop an active Muslim political base within the target society to infiltrate and influence the political, educational and legal structure of the country to facilitate the expansion of Islamic influence.

� Use bribes, blackmail and badgering of non-Muslim authorities to get them to overlook subversive activities.

� Strengthen Islamic financial networks to fund political power and influence. Large scale acquisition of land and resources by any means possible. (Funded by Muslim charities; Gulf countries Oil revenue and criminal activities).

� Commence lobbying and agitation for acceptance of a limited, semi- autonomous status, in areas heavily populated by Muslims.

� Aggressive public attacks and character assassination of critics aimed at intimidating those who oppose their demands. Dismiss all critics as racist bigots, Islamophobes, intolerant red-necks and Zionists.

�

� NOTE: As a sense of empowerment develops, the fa�ade of tolerance toward non-Muslims falls away and Islamic leaders place greater demands upon Muslims to adopt a strict Islamic way of life and take up a more stridently assertive posture toward the host country. The Friday sermons in mosques become more inflammatory and intolerant describing those who refuse to convert or submit as �counter-initiatory forces� and �rejectionists� who must be neutralised.

�

� Muslim enclaves (millets) become �no-go� areas for non-Muslims, elements of sharia law are implemented in those areas, and the nation�s laws are no longer relevant, co-operation with infidel police ceases and disciplinary matters are dealt with according to Islamic precepts. However, demands are still made on local governments and utilities to maintain municipal services.

� Clandestine amassing of weapons and explosive caches within the enclaves.

� Non Muslim residents in the millets are now required to comply with the new social order (Islamic dress rules for females, no alcohol, halal food only etc.) or are harassed till they leave the enclave.

� Enclaves expand radially, and eventually overlap, forming bigger millets

� Continuous and covert nocturnal raids and challenges commence against adjacent target �infidel� suburbs, influential community leaders, liquor outlets, video stores and non-Islamic religious buildings.( synagogues, churches and temples)

� Overt disregard, animosity and rejection of the host society's mores, civil authorities, and culture become the norm.

� Efforts to undermine and destroy the power base of non-Muslim religions such as Jews, Christians, Hindus or Buddhists.

� Efforts to destroy the social structure of the country and bring about the downfall of non-Muslim government.

� Use of Islamic gangs in a campaign of fear and terror against all other religions and secularists to reduce their numbers and influence.

� NOTE: At this point, statelets now exist within a state and full autonomy is demanded. Having seen �the writing on the wall,� local and state governments acquiesce; religious �conversions of convenience� become common among the softened-up populace, merely to avoid the violent onslaught. Others belatedly form militias as a last-ditch attempt to oppose the spread of Islam and defend all they hold dear.

STAGE THREE:

OPEN WAR WITH TARGET NON-ISLAMIST SOCIETY'S LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE

• Large-scale destruction of property, assassinations, killings, bombings.
• Intentional policy to spread chaos in the streets to undermine the national government and public resistance.
• Acts of barbarity and fierceness as a deliberate policy intended to foster submission of opponents.
• Open and covert efforts to cause economic collapse of the society.
• All opposition, irrespective, is challenged and either eradicated or silenced.
• Widespread ethnic cleansing of �rejectionists� by Islamic militias.
• Murder of all opposing political, religious and intellectual leaders of the host country.
• Elimination of all moderate Muslim intellectual �traitors� who had, at any time, supported other alternatives to radical Islam.
• Toppling of government and usurpation of political power.
• Imposition of Sharia law.
• Mass execution of non-Muslims, ethnic cleansing.

STAGE FOUR:

ISLAMIC THEOCRACY

• The Qur�an and the Sharia becomes the "law of the land."
• All non-Islamic human rights cancelled.
• Freedom of speech and press eradicated.
• All Religions other than Islam are forbidden and destroyed.
• Enslavement and genocide of non-Muslim population.
• Destruction of all evidence of non-Muslim culture and symbols in the country.

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