Showing posts with label história. Show all posts
Showing posts with label história. Show all posts

Monday, March 5, 2012

General duvida que Dilma tenha sido torturada na ditadura


General duvida que Dilma tenha sido torturada na ditadura

E lança suspeita sobre participação da presidente em atentado
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Atualizado:

General Luiz Eduardo Rocha Paiva
Foto: Reprodução TV
General Luiz Eduardo Rocha PaivaREPRODUÇÃO TV
RIO - O general Luiz Eduardo Rocha Paiva acha que a Comissão da Verdade, para não ser “parcial e maniqueísta”, tem que convocar também os que participaram de ações armadas, direta ou indiretamente. Não hesita em perguntar até se a presidente Dilma Rousseff não tem que depor:
- Ela era da VAR-Palmares, que lançou o carro-bomba que matou o soldado Mario Kozel Filho. A comissão não vai chamá-la, por quê?
Rocha Paiva se refere ao atentado ocorrido em 26 de junho de 1968 no Quartel-General do II Exército, em São Paulo. Até 2007 Rocha Paiva ocupava posição de destaque no Exército. Foi comandante da Escola de Comando do Estado-Maior do Exército e secretário-geral do Exército. Abaixo, trechos da entrevista:
O GLOBO: Por que o senhor é contra a Comissão da Verdade?
ROCHA PAIVA: Eu sou contra a Comissão da Verdade, agora não adianta ser contra. Ela vai existir. Era contra no momento em que ela pretende apurar a memória histórica do país. Isso é trabalho para pesquisadores e para historiadores e não para uma comissão, que eu vejo como uma comissão chapa branca. Ela busca a reconciliação nacional depois de 30 anos, e não há mais cisão nenhuma, que tenha ficado do regime militar, inclusive porque as Forças Armadas são instituições da mais alta credibilidade no país. Então, não vejo a necessidade. Acho que se há alguma coisa a investigar é só usar a Policia Federal e, com vontade política, a presidente tem autoridade pra ir até onde ela quiser, respeitada a Lei de Anistia. Eu fiz uma análise da lei da Comissão Nacional da Verdade. E eu vejo que essa lei não é imparcial. Esse facciosismo e o provável maniqueísmo  do seu relatório a gente pode ver a partir dos  objetivos.
Por que o senhor acha que é parcial?
ROCHA PAIVA: O objetivo é promover o esclarecimento de torturas, mortes, desaparecimentos forçados e ocultação de cadáveres. Por que não promover também o esclarecimento de atentados terroristas e sequestros de pessoas e aviões e de execução e justiçamento até de companheiros da luta armada que tentavam desertar? Ora, a pessoa pode alegar, na comissão, que isso não é objeto da lei, mas tinha que ser objeto da lei. O outro objetivo da lei é tornar públicos os locais e instituições e instâncias onde ocorreram violações de direitos humanos. Ora, por que não também tornar  públicos os locais de cativeiros de sequestrados, os locais de atentados terroristas e as áreas de homizio da luta armada, dos grupos armados dos partidos ilegais que conspiravam não para trazer liberdade para o país e democracia, mas para implantar aqui uma ditadura totalitária comunista?
O argumento de quem defende a lei é de que quem esteve contra o regime foi punido. Foi preso, foi torturado, foi exilado. E o Estado exercia o poder. E exerceu o poder contra o cidadão de forma autoritária, de forma abusiva. O que o senhor acha desse argumento?
ROCHA PAIVA: Eu acho que ele não cola. Pelo seguinte: nem todos os assassinos, terroristas, nem todos os sequestradores são conhecidos. Alguns que executaram a ação, sim, são conhecidos. Outros que planejaram ou estiveram no apoio logístico e no financiamento, esses não são conhecidos. Então, eles deveriam ser conhecidos também.
Por que os militares quando tinham todo o poder não fizeram essa apuração?
ROCHA PAIVA: Às vezes, não havia condições de fazer. Não houve possibilidade de fazer. porque se estava combatendo grupos armados que estavam executando operações. Veja bem uma coisa: a lei estabelece que as atividades da comissão não terão caráter persecutório e jurisdicional. No entanto, o ministro Ayres de Britto, do STF reconheceu, em parecer, à revelia da Lei da Anistia, o direito daqueles que se sentiram vítimas do regime militar moverem ações civis indenizatórias contra ex-agentes do Estado. Ora, se houve anistia, quem tem que indenizar, como já está fazendo, é o Estado. No momento que o ministro Ayres Britto abre esse precedente, quem for ouvido na comissão da Verdade poderá estar produzindo provas contra si próprio. Agora, ele abriu um precedente também e aí é que eu digo que a Comissão da Verdade, embora não esteja disposta a investigar os crimes da luta armada, se uma pessoa foi vítima de uma ação da luta armada, e ficou com sequelas, ela também tem o direito, até baseada no parecer do ministro Ayres de Britto, de mover ações civis indenizatórias contra esses guerrilheiros, terroristas, que numa ação armada deixaram uma vítima ou sequela em alguém. Eles terão direito, se não for investigado o que foi feito pela luta armada, essas pessoas não saberão quem são os responsáveis por suas sequelas. E a Justiça é igual para todos.
O senhor não acha que é preciso saber o que aconteceu com as 183 pessoas que desapareceram, entre eles pessoas que não tinham nenhum envolvimento com um órgão clandestino. Isso sem levar em conta que o que era legal e o que era ilegal era estabelecido por um governo que não foi eleito, era uma ditadura. Portanto a ilegalidade de alguns partidos é questionável. O ex-deputado Rubens Paiva sumiu dentro de uma guarnição do Exército. Ele foi preso, levado para o Terceiro Comar, e depois, de lá, para um quartel da Policia do Exército, onde foi visto pela última vez. A família há 41 anos busca informação e não tem. O Exército não tem a obrigação de dar informação?
ROCHA PAIVA: Como já falei, a presidente da República, comandante suprema das Forças Armadas, tem autoridade para abrir uma investigação. Ressalvada a Lei da Anistia, ela tem autoridade para abrir uma investigação. Por que ela não faz? Não sei. Não precisa uma comissão da verdade, que só vai investigar um lado, para isso. Veja bem: é emblemático o caso Rubens Paiva. Por que? O homem foi deputado, das classes favorecidas e todos se preocupam com ele e com Stuart Angel, também. Agora, por que os crimes do PC do B no Araguaia, crime como por exemplo o da perseguição e morte de mateiros, que eram guias das forças legais. Teve um que foi  torturado e assassinado na frente da mãe e do pai. Eles cortaram a orelha do rapaz na frente da mãe. O menino urrava de dor, a mãe desmaiou.
Os guerrilheiros do Araguaia foram quase todos mortos, exceto um ou outro.
ROCHA PAIVA: Nem todos. E quem os comandava, que estava em São Paulo a dois mil quilômetros de distância, no bem-bom?  Não vamos saber quem foram? Quem deu a ordem pra matar esse rapaz? Por que isso não é emblemático?  Porque ele era um zé-ninguém. Por que também não se apura quem deu ordem no PC do B para que as mulheres da guerrilha que engravidassem tivessem que abortar na região. Eles deram essa ordem.
O senhor sabe de torturas dentro do Exército? Chegou a ver?
ROCHA PAIVA: Não...eu não vi tortura dentro do Exército.
O senhor nunca soube de tortura dentro do Exército?
ROCHA PAIVA: Ah, para saber basta a senhora ir às livrarias, comprar uns livros, a senhora vai ver um rol  de casos de tortura.
O senhor não acha que isso é um desvio?
ROCHA PAIVA: Isso é um desvio, ninguém está dizendo que não é um desvio. Agora, não foi anistiado? Não é desvio também aqueles grupos armados revolucionários da esquerda, que seguiam linha maoísta, linha soviética, linha cubana, que queriam implantar aqui uma ditadura nos moldes das soviética, chinesa e cubana, que são as responsáveis pelos maiores crimes contra a Humanidade no século passado? Então, esses grupos que queriam se tornar Estado, usavam de atentados terroristas e tortura, com que moral esse grupo condena as violações no outro grupo?
O senhor acha então que está justificada a tortura dentro da instalação militar...
ROCHA PAIVA: Não. Eu não estou dizendo que está justificado. Estou mostrando o seguinte: que existiu uma luta, que foram cometidos desvios pelos dois lados, só que houve uma anistia.
Um lado foi punido. A presidente Dilma Rousseff ficou presa três anos e foi submetida a tortura.
ROCHA PAIVA: Sim, ela diz que foi submetida a torturas. A senhora tem certeza?
Ah, eu acredito nela...
ROCHA PAIVA: ah, e eu não sei. A senhora quer ver uma coisa? Veja bem.: quero um exemplo histórico de uma guerrilha revolucionária marxista, leninista, maoísta que não tenha usado violência, atentados terroristas e violado direitos humanos. Eu quero que me mostre um caso histórico de uma reação a essa esquerda revolucionária que tenha tido um desfecho tão pouco traumático como no Brasil. Porque na realidade, no Brasil, o governo e a oposição legal queriam a redemocratização do país. Então, no governo e na Arena era a redemocratização gradual e segura.
Demorou 25 anos...
ROCHA PAIVA: Exato. Dez anos de atraso. Dez anos de atraso, por causa da luta armada.
O senhor acha que a sua opinião é compartilhada pelos que estão na ativa?
ROCHA PAIVA: A opinião? Qual opinião? Eu não estou justificando a tortura. Tortura é crime como o terrorismo é crime. Sou contra endeusar terrorista, sequestrador porque estavam combatendo pela liberdade, porque não estavam. E satanizar o torturador. O torturador é um criminoso que vê a pessoa a quem ele está fazendo mal e ele causa mal a essa pessoa que é inimiga dele, em seus ideais. O terrorista bota bomba no cinema, no saguão do aeroporto e mata mulheres, crianças e até mulheres grávidas.
Como a bomba do Riocentro que foi levada pelo Exército?
ROCHA PAIVA: A bomba do Riocentro, o caso foi reaberto em 1999 em pleno regime democrático de direito. Foram apontados cinco responsáveis. O Juiz mandou arquivar por falta de provas.
Explodiu no colo do sargento, general
ROCHA PAIVA: Quem é que pode dizer o que aconteceu?
Todos os indícios. O senhor acha então que o Capitão Wilson, o sargento não estavam levando a bomba?
ROCHA PAIVA: O processo foi arquivado por falta de provas. A senhora acha que foram eles?
Sim, claro!
ROCHA PAIVA: Eu não tenho provas.
O senhor acha que essa sua opinião, essas suas opiniões, por exemplo contra a comissão da Verdade, são compartilhadas por pessoas que estão na ativa?
ROCHA PAIVA: Olha, eu não tenho dúvida de que é geral. Agora, a gente tem que ver o seguinte: o que um militar na ativa pode falar? Ele não pode falar contra o governo. Agora, digo para a senhora o seguinte: chefes militares cultuam hierarquia, disciplina e também justiça. Ante a iminência de uma injustiça que vai ser perpetrada contra seus subordinados, ele tem obrigação moral e funcional de - com franqueza, disciplina, sem alarde e dentro da lei - levar a sua posição a seus comandantes superiores. Se eles não fizerem isso, eles não são dignos de serem chefes. E o que está na iminência de acontecer? Com a comissão da Verdade, aqueles agentes do Estado, tenham ou não torturado - porque o que a Comissão da Verdade quer é expor a cara de todo mundo que tenha participado dos órgãos de inteligência, de informação; eles querem expor todo mundo - então, tenham ou não torturado. vai ser execrado. Eles têm obrigação moral de...esse pessoal entrou ali, muita gente combateu por ideal e se sacrificou. Se alguns cometeram deslizes, foram anistiados, assim como foram anistiados os terroristas, sequestradores e assassinos.
O que o senhor acha que os comandantes militares têm que fazer a respeito?
ROCHA PAIVA: Eles não têm que sair pra imprensa pra falar nada. O que acho que eles estão fazendo - eu não posso dizer, estou dizendo pela formação que eu tive - eles estão levando essa preocupação à presidente da República. Porque eu acho que o homem livre é escravo da sua consciência e a consciência é juíza perene de sua vida. Ele não é escravo de cargos e posições. Ele arrisca cargos e posições por aquilo que ele acredita que é seu ideal. Dentro da lei.
Dentro de uma instituição tão respeitável quanto o Exército Brasileiro houve tortura. Há várias provas. E o senhor mesmo disse que é desvio. Se é desvio, o Exército não deveria ser o primeiro a querer que fossem punidos para que tudo aquilo ficasse em pratos limpos?
ROCHA PAIVA: Olha, o que passou e foi anistiado não pode ser retocado. Veja bem: anistia não é um instrumento jurídico. É um instrumento político. No Brasil, a sociedade apoiou o governo no combate à luta armada. Anistia não foi para reconciliar a nação. A nação estava do lado do governo senão nós teríamos hoje talvez umas Farc aqui, ou um Sendero Luminoso. Para que veio a anistia? Veio para neutralizar radicas à esquerda e à direita, que poderiam prejudicar a redemocratização.
General, anistia estabelece que não pode haver punição. Mas ela não impede que se busque a informação. E não é isso que a Comissão da Verdade está fazendo?
ROCHA PAIVA: Nunca no Brasil, na História do Brasil, se precisou de Comissão da Verdade para saber o que aconteceu na ditadura Vargas. Historiadores fazem isso. Se quiser investigar crimes que tenham ocorrido, independente de anistia, faz-se uma investigação policial. A presidente chama a Policia Federal, o Ministério Público, quem quer que seja, e manda investigar.
Toda a vez que se pede aos comandantes militares documentos, eles dizem que os documentos foram destruídos. E aí será que não tem documentos?
ROCHA PAIVA: Agora, vamos ver o seguinte: existem normas de controle de documentos. sigilosos. Então, você pega e tem um inquérito. Os presos ficavam em organizações de Doi-Codi. Não eram tanto dentro de quarteis. Alguns ficavam dentro de quarteis. Eu mesmo quando cheguei a aspirante tinha preso no quartel que eu cheguei. Era preso normal. Levava a vida dele normal.
Levavam a vida normal não, estavam presos.
ROCHA PAIVA: Sim, vida de preso normal....
A Comissão quer buscar informação. Não é importante buscar a informação?
ROCHA PAIVA: Ah, sim. A senhora falou dos documentos. O que acontece? Faz-se um inquérito no quartel. Terminado aquele inquérito, ele vai para o STM. Chegando no STM, aquele inquérito está lá arquivado. No quartel, fica uma cópia. Essa cópia, a partir de determinado momento, é destruída. E esses inquéritos foram feios até 1979. Nenhum documento confidencial passa de ...naquele tempo eram dez anos.
Então, como saber o que aconteceu com Rubens Paiva, por exemplo?
ROCHA PAIVA: Se foi feito algum documento...
Ele morreu dentro de um estabelecimento militar. Ninguém tem registro?
ROCHA PAIVA: A senhora está dizendo, que ele morreu dentro de um estabelecimento militar. Eu não sei. A senhora tem certeza?
Ele foi visto lá pela última vez.
ROCHA PAIVA: Foi visto. Não estou dizendo que é o caso dele, mas tem gente que hoje em dia é considerado desaparecido, porque estava na luta armada, queria sair da luta armada, estava preso, recebeu documentação e mudou de vida. Então, alguns desaparecidos não querem nem aparecer. Um apareceu, que estava lá na Noruega, quando soube que ia receber dinheiro. Era um desaparecido que apareceu. Dona Miriam, veja bem...
No caso do Rubens Paiva, foi aberto um IPM para tentar descobrir que foi que aconteceu. Foi em 1986, mas ele foi arquivado sem que houvesse uma investigação séria. Portanto, o caminho de se fazer apenas a investigação às vezes não dá certo. Não é melhor criar uma comissão, como outros países fizeram?
ROCHA PAIVA: Os outros países fizeram comissões da verdade dentro de outros quadros. Veja bem: a  comissão da verdade emblemática é a da África do Sul, certo? Ela é feita antes de conceder a anistia. E pra receber a anistia, tinha que passar na comissão. E eram anistiados os dois lados., que confessassem seus crimes e relacionassem seus crimes a motivações políticas. Os dois lados foram anistiados. O Pacto de Moncloa, na Espanha, também anistiou os dois lados. Eu não vejo necessidade, depois de 30 anos, é só investigação policial. Porque chamar lá alguém pra ser ouvido: Ainda mais, veja bem: se eu sou um ex-agente do Estado e sou chamado na comissão da verdade, sabendo que alguém pode mover uma ação civil indenizatória contra a minha pessoa, estando eu anistiado, eu vou chegar lá e vou dizer que não sei de nada. Eu vou falar por quê? Qual a motivação que eu tenho? Se eu abrir a minha boca, vou ser penalizado. Depois de 30 anos? Então isso não tem explicação...
O senhor acha justo que os torturadores não sejam conhecidos, não sejam punidos, sequer se informe sobre os crimes que eles praticaram ou que tenham que dar explicação sobre pessoas que desapareceram quando estavam sob a custódia do Estado?
ROCHA PAIVA: Faça-se uma investigação, e não comissão da verdade. Eu não vejo porque eles têm que aparecer agora, porque eles estão anistiados. Por que não tem que aparecer também quem sequestrou, quem planejou? Se uma autoridade, hoje, tiver participado; até a presidente Dilma,tiver participado, seja diretamente ou indiretamente, que aí é co-responsável, de um crime que tenha deixado sequelas com vítimas, vai haver a comissão da verdade? A presidente vai aparecer?  É isso que a senhora quer depois de 30 anos?
O senhor não acha que o país tem que olhar para esse passado?
ROCHA PAIVA: Então vamos olhar para os dois lados do passado. Se a presidente, se o senhor Franklin Martins e gente que a gente não sabe que participou do planejamento. Da execução, a gente já sabe, mas do planejamento e do apoio não. Quem é que participou dos comitês dos julgamentos que resultaram no justiçamento, assassinato dos próprios companheiros, quem participou? Por que eu não posso saber? Eu só vou ter que saber quem for agente do Estado? Eu não acho isso justo...
General, os senhores tiveram 25 anos de poder. Eles eram seus inimigos. Se vocês não têm a informação, é porque a informação não existe. Ou vocês não foram capazes de apurar.
ROCHA PAIVA: A informação pode ser, a senhora não quer que apure? Então, eu quero que apure o outro lado também. A senhora está sendo maniqueísta, a senhora está sendo facciosa já que vai haver a comissão da verdade, veja bem - eu sou contra a existência - mas agora que vai haver que investigue os dois lados. Quem eram os terroristas mataram no Araguaia?
E quem matou as pessoas, os guerrilheiros que estavam no Araguaia?
ROCHA PAIVA: Vamos botar na comissão da verdade todos. Os dois lados. A senhora está insistindo que se faça um lado. Estou dizendo: vamos os dois. A senhora está sendo facciosa, eu não. Eu estou dizendo que eu quero os dois lados. A senhora está dizendo que é um só.
Os militares assumiram o poder e usaram o Estado contra as pessoas. Ninguém jamais foi preso, ninguém jamais foi condenado, o Exército nunca reconheceu quem torturou. O senhor não acha que quando se faz isso não pode ficar claro o conluio do Exército com torturadores?
ROCHA PAIVA: Quem é que vai afirmar quem torturou? Outra coisa: a senhora falou que o Exército atuava contra as pessoas. Não. O Estado, e não era só o Exército, o Estado, seus órgãos policiais atuaram, não  foi contra pessoas, tanto que a população apoiou quem? O governo. A população não apoiou a luta armada. Eles viviam homiziados, escondidos, porque, se aparecessem na rua, às vezes, eram denunciados. Tinham que estar todos camuflados, escondidos. Por que? Porque a população apoiou, apoiou fortemente o Estado contra a luta armada. A senhora fala em ditadura, tortura, me diga uma democracia, um organismo internacional que tenha reconhecido qualquer grupo da luta armada como estando defendendo a liberdade, ou representando parte do povo brasileiro. Não tem. Eu fui observador militar da ONU em El Salvador e a FMLN foi reconhecida; os representantes dos vietcongs, nas conversações em Paris, existiam. E era uma luta armada. Agora, no Brasil, não houve nenhum grupo. A senhora fala em ditadura, eu falo em regime autoritário. Regime autoritário, Hannah Arendt diferenciou bem de regime totalitário. Regime autoritário limita a liberdade individual, limita a liberdade de expressão, limita a liberdade política. Mas no Brasil nós tínhamos Grupo Opinião de Teatro, tínhamos peças teatrais que condenavam a ditadura, tínhamos músicas de protesto, tínhamos festivais da canção, tínhamos o Pasquim, tinhamos o Febeapá.
No Pasquim todo mundo foi preso!
ROCHA PAIVA: É o que digo, limitada a liberdade. Não deixaram de existir. O Pasquim deixou de existir depois do regime militar. Então, eles existiam. As livrarias vendiam livros de Marx, Engels, Lênin, Trotsky. Que ditadura totalitária é essa? Existia uma oposição que disputava eleição, ganhava e perdia eleição, que tinha espaço nos jornais. Eu via Ulysses Guimarães sempre falando e criticando. Que ditadura totalitária é essa?
Então, o senhor concorda com os 25 anos de regime militar...
ROCHA PAIVA: Eu concordo com os 25 anos, sem dúvida! Podia ser talvez menos um pouco.
O senhor começou a sua carreira exatamente no ano em que aumentou a repressão.
ROCHA PAIVA: Aumentou a luta armada! Aumentou a luta armada. A repressão é consequência da luta armada.
Com o AI-5, o regime se aprofundou e aumentou, portanto, os casos de desaparecidos e os casos de mortos, o caso Rubens Paiva, por exemplo, acontece em 71. O senhor fez a carreira nessa época, nunca ouviu sequer falar que havia tortura dentro dos...
ROCHA PAIVA: Miriam, sempre se falou. Agora, me diz uma coisa: quando é que não houve tortura no Brasil? Houve tortura em Getúlio? Houve. Houve tortura no tempo da democracia? Houve. Houve tortura no regime militar? Houve. Está havendo tortura agora? Está. O Brasil é condenado na ONU, ou é acusado na ONU, por violação de direitos humanos por agentes do Estado, do Estado democrático de direito. A senhora quer fazer um cálculo comigo? A senhora pega o livro "Brasil, nunca mais". Arquidiocese de São Paulo. Insuspeita. Arquidiocese de São Paulo, dom Paulo Evaristo Arns. Fizeram pesquisas nos arquivos do STM. Levantaram, antes de 1995, portanto antes da lei de indenização Bolsa-ditadura. Levantaram 1.918 torturados. Se a senhora dividir isso por dez anos, e eu só estou considerando o tempo da luta armada, porque se for 20 anos é muito menos. Dez anos de luta armada, doze meses no ano e trinta dias, a senhora vai ter menos de um torturado por dia. Aí, a senhora vai para depois de 1995, o livro do Chievenatto, em 2004, aí já tinha saído a Bolsa-ditadura. Portanto, todo mundo que entrou em Doi-Codi, tá certo?, Até pra prestar um depoimento, por ser testemunha está dizendo que foi torturado. Aí esse número de 1918, depois que sai o Bolsa-ditadura, sobe pra 20 mil torturados. Se a senhora fizer essa mesma conta que eu fiz, a senhora vai chegar a seis torturados por dia. Então uma média de meio torturado por dia, se é que se pode se dizer assim, e seis. A senhora vai ter em torno de quatro torturados por dia por conta da luta armada. Miriam, se nós formos, agora, em qualquer presídio nesse Brasil inteiro, vamos encontrar muito mais gente sendo torturada agora. Por que ninguém se sensibiliza com isso? Sabe por quê? Por que quem está sendo preso agora, está sendo torturado não defende ideia marxista-leninista, não é da classe média, não é filho de deputado, não é artista. A esquerda radical, revanchista, hipócrita e incoerente se solidariza com esse pessoal do outro tempo. E olham que eram quatro por dia, no máximo, tá certo? Eu não estou tirando a hediondez do crime! Eu estou mostrando que isso está acontecendo agora, e ninguém se incomoda. Esses que estão sendo agora torturados, não vão ser indenizados, como foram aqueles que foram presos no tempo do regime militar. Então, isso é injustiça.
O senhor não acha que é mais inteligente da parte das Forças Armadas admitirem que houve o erro? Até para preservar o nome da instituição, dizer que a instituição, como um todo não concordava com os desvios que aconteceram no Doi-Codi, na Polícia do Exército, em todos esses aparelhos de tortura instalados dentro das organizações ?
ROCHA PAIVA: Eu não vejo por  que pedir perdão, se não houve nenhuma cisão social remanescente do regime militar. Quando saiu o regime militar, que começaram a fazer pesquisas, as Forças Armadas já estavam no topo das instituições de maior credibilidade do país, acima até da imprensa. Então, por que essa instituição precisa pedir perdão?
Porque é crime general, porque é crime.
ROCHA PAIVA: Não, não. Foi anistiado, foi anistiado, eu insisto nisso. Foi anistiado, então parou aí. Vamos investigar o que aconteceu? Vamos. Mas está anistiado. Não tem que pedir perdão coisa nenhuma. É interessante a hipocrisia da nossa sociedade. Bate palma e aplaude o "Tropa de Elite". Eu acho hipócrita. Eu faço a pergunta assim, de chofre: se um filho seu ou um neto seu for sequestrado, e a policia botar a mão no sequestrador que sabe onde está o esconderijo dele e aí? ... A senhora demorou a responder.
Estou esperando até onde o senhor vai ...
ROCHA PAIVA: A senhora demorou a responder. Então o que eu digo é hipocrisia.
Não estou aqui para responder. Estou para fazer perguntas. Eu pergunto, o senhor responde.
ROCHA PAIVA: Não é um programa de debate?
Não. Eu não estou debatendo com o senhor. Estou apresentando questões que são colocadas por pessoas que discordam do senhor...
ROCHA PAIVA: Eu estou respondendo. Eu estou, num programa de entrevistas, fazendo uma pergunta. Não pode? Não pode?
Estou querendo saber sobre o Exército. Se não é melhor ele admitir que houve desvio, houve tortura. E, portanto, ele não torturará mais...
ROCHA PAIVA: Ô, Miriam...Vai na livraria, você, lógico que já leu...Dezenas de livros que contam sobre tortura. Precisa admitir? Precisa admitir? Tá lá escrito. Quem quiser, que acredite. Quem não quiser, não acredite. Certo? Então. Tá escrito. Não precisa admitir. A sociedade cobraria das Forças Armadas, se ela não tivesse colocada as Forças Armadas no topo das instituições de credibilidade. Então, se houve violações naquele momento, a sociedade já perdoou. Se não ela não estaria lá no topo das instituições de credibilidade, acima até da imprensa...
Eu acho que agora é um outro Exército...
ROCHA PAIVA: Não. É o mesmo.
É o mesmo Exército que torturou?
ROCHA PAIVA: A senhora que está falando em tortura. Eu estou dizendo o seguinte: Quem evoluiu, foi o país. E o Exército evoluiu junto do país. Todos os presidentes militares falavam de redemocratização e admitiram que era um Estado de exceção. Eu listo para a senhora 16 crises político-militares envolvendo militar, partido político, o Exército dividido. De 22 a 64, existem 16 crises militares. Aí vem 1964, revolução de 31 de março. Luta armada. Dez anos depois, redemocratização  e abertura. Me diga uma crise político-militar que teve no país depois disso. Por que? Porque a Revolução se encarregou de separar o militar da política, por isso automaticamente reforçou as instituições do país, os poderes nacionais e nunca mais houve uma crise político-militar no país. Então, um dos grandes feitos do regime militar foi afastar as Forças Armadas da política e isso é uma das causas da nossa democracia estar estável hoje.
Eu queria que o senhor fizesse uma reflexão sobre o fato de que, nos outros países, houve punição, prisão de torturador e até responsabilidade de comandantes, como, por exemplo, o general Videla, que foi presidente da Argentina, ou Pinochet, que foi presidente do Chile. Eu queria que o senhor falasse sobre isso. Por que eles usaram esse caminho e nós, não?
ROCHA PAIVA: Primeiramente, nos três países, tanto Argentina, Uruguai e Chile, eles cometeram uma falha. A anistia lá não foi ampla, geral e irrestrita. A anistia lá foi para os agentes do Estado. Então, com isso, a anistia se esvaziou. Só que no Uruguai fizeram um referendo e o povo uruguaio foi a favor da manutenção da anistia. Na Argentina e no Chile, a luta armada foi muito mais violenta que no país, do que no Brasil. Então, são condições diferentes, são países diferentes. São países com a veia espanhola muito radical e muito açodada e são condições diferentes do país. Cada país escolhe o seu caminho.
O que o senhor acha da Operação Condor que unia os países do Cone Sul, inclusive o Brasil, em troca de prisioneiros, em troca de informação, em troca de técnicas de tortura? E também o que acha da operação Oban, que uniu líderes empresariais com as Forças Armadas?
ROCHA PAIVA: A senhora está falando em convênio de países para enfrentar problemas comuns? Tinha um convênio entre os países da cortina de ferro para enfrentar problemas comuns. Os Estados Unidos têm a Otan. Hoje, os Estados Unidos têm convênios com vários países para a questão do terrorismo. Os grupos de esquerda armados, revolucionários, tinham ligações internacionais também; então, é mais que natural, essas ligações internacionais para troca de informações, certo? Para trocar informações operacionais e também da parte doutrinária.
O senhor acha que a Operação Condor foi apenas um acordo entre os países? O senhor acha normal?
ROCHA PAIVA: Ah, sim, isso existe hoje, isso existe hoje. Nós temos reuniões bilaterais de inteligência, de doutrina. E não é só reunião bilateral no campo militar, não. Tem relação bilateral no campo da indústria, do comércio, certo? Isso é normal entre os países. E eles enfrentaram problemas comuns. Os grupos armados de esquerda no Brasil, eles também tinham ligações internacionais, só que isso aí ninguém fala.
E a Oban?
ROCHA PAIVA: A Oban eu não tenho conhecimento. Eu sei que...Eu não sei nem em que ano começou. Sinceramente,se eu soubesse eu diria.
O Vladimir Herzog era diretor de uma emissora, não era guerrilheiro. Ele foi se apresentar para depor e morreu.
ROCHA PAIVA: E quem disse que ele foi morto pelos agentes do Estado? Isso há controvérsias. Há uma controvérsia quando a isso aí. Quem disse que ele foi morto pelos agentes do Estado? Ninguém pode afirmar. 
ROCHA PAIVA: Se não foram os militares que mataram Vladimir Herzog, por que os militares que estavam lá naquele momento não aparecem na comissão da Verdade?
ROCHA PAIVA: Existe um inquérito e está escrito no inquérito. Chame os oficiais que estão ali. Se é que tinha algum oficial, se não era gente da Policia Federal, da Policia Militar ou da Policia Civil. Chame a pessoa e consulte. Agora, chame também quem pode ter mandado matar ou quem pode ter dado a ordem para assassinar o capitão Chandler, assassinado na frente do seu filho. Chegaram na cabeça dele e deram mais de vinte tiros na cabeça dele. Isso na frente do filho dele. Quem fez, a gente sabe. Mas quem planejou e apoiou. A gente não sabe, precisa saber. Foi a ALN. Quem era da ALN? O nosso senador Aloysio. O senador que foi relator da Comissão da Verdade, do projeto de lei. Aloysio Nunes Ferreira. Ele era da ALN. Será que ele não tem alguma coisa? Vamos chamar o senador na Comissão da Verdade? Sim. Por que não? Vamos chamar a presidente Dilma? Ela era da VAR-Palmares. E a VAR-Palmares foi a que lançou o carro-bomba que matou o soldado Mario Kozel Filho. Ela era da parte de apoio. Será que ela participou do apoio a essa operação? A comissão da Verdade não vai chamá-la, por quê? Entende? Minha posição é essa.


Tuesday, December 6, 2011

Trajeto casa-trabalho de cariocas ficou 39 minutos mais demorado em dois anos


Trajeto casa-trabalho de cariocas ficou 39 minutos mais demorado em dois anos

O GLOBO
Publicado:

RIO - No trajeto casa-trabalho, os cariocas estão gastando, em média, duas longas horas, segundo a Pesquisa de Percepção 2011 do Rio Como Vamos. São 39 minutos a mais do que o tempo constatado há dois anos, na edição anterior do trabalho. Com tal realidade, não é difícil entender uma das maiores razões de insatisfação de quem mora no Rio de Janeiro: o trânsito, classificado de regular ou ruim por 75% das 1.358 pessoas que responderam à pesquisa. Os engarrafamentos são os vilões da história, segundo quase todos os entrevistados.

OPINIÃO: Você perde muito tempo no trânsito? Conte a sua história

O Rio Como Vamos vê nesses números a confirmação do que o carioca sente na pele: o trânsito está cada vez mais caótico, especialmente nas zonas Norte e Oeste, aquelas com maiores parcelas de insatisfeitos. Um nó que não é difícil de entender. Afinal, a frota da cidade tem crescido, desde 2006, de 4% a 5% ao ano. E 2010 terminou com 2,365 milhões de veículos licenciados pelo Detran, um carro para cada 2,7 pessoas. Em julho deste ano, já eram 2,438 milhões. Além da grande quantidade de carros, frentes de obras, muitas delas relacionadas aos projetos de transportes para as Olimpíadas, também ajudam a deixar as ruas mais estreitas, prejudicando o tráfego.

Da pesquisa surge ainda um alerta: não são só os engarrafamentos que incomodam, mas também o mau comportamento dos motoristas que desrespeitam as leis do trânsito.

Entre os entrevistados, 54% dependem do transporte público (45% são usuários de ônibus e o restante de outras modalidades), que não foi bem avaliado: recebeu classificação regular ou ruim da metade dos entrevistados. Superlotação e longos intervalos entre os veículos são os principais motivos de reclamação, principalmente nas zonas Norte e Oeste.

Para o Rio Como Vamos, a redução das horas perdidas no trânsito e a melhoria do transporte coletivo são primordiais para a qualidade de vida do trabalhador, que terá mais tempo para se dedicar à família e às atividades pessoais. Por isso, o RCV acompanha com expectativa o projeto dos BRTs, corredores expressos de ônibus. O Transoeste, o Transcarioca, a Transolímpica e a Transbrasil devem reduzir a viagem entre os extremos dos percursos em 50 a 70 minutos, beneficiando em especial as zonas Oeste e Norte. BRTs são apontados como solução viável e eficiente

Professor de engenharia de transportes da Coppe/UFRJ, Ronaldo Balassiano considera os BRTs uma opção factível (mais barata e rápida de implantar que o metrô) e eficiente. Mas diz que, para o carioca aceitar deixar o carro na garagem, será necessária uma campanha para convencê-lo da qualidade e dos benefícios do serviço. Assim como a pesquisa do RCV, que mostrou que 39% dos cariocas nunca ouviram falar do BRT, um trabalho coordenado por Balassiano na região do Transoeste (Barra-Santa Cruz) mostrou resultado semelhante. Mais preocupante ainda: 66% dos usuários de carros disseram que não abririam mão deles.

- Vejo os BRTs com otimismo, mas, para que funcionem bem, será preciso que os arredores dos corredores sejam revitalizados e que nas estações de integração haja centros comerciais e de serviços. Assim, se evitará que as pessoas se desloquem entre os extremos dos corredores - diz ele.

As obras do Transoeste e do Transcarioca têm previsão de inauguração entre maio de 2012 e o segundo semestre de 2013. As demais serão entregues até 2015. Para o RCV, como essas obras têm prazos extensos, seria interessante o poder público estudar medidas para minimizar hoje os problemas enfrentados por moradores sobretudo das zonas Oeste e Norte.

Segundo Alexandre Sansão, secretário municipal de Transportes, os BRTs substituirão linhas de ônibus longas e deficitárias por uma ligação racionalizada e com intervalos fixos. Como a Zona Oeste é a região com transporte mais precário, o Transoeste foi o primeiro projeto iniciado. O BRT atenderá 200 mil passageiros por dia.

Segundo a Fetranspor, as soluções para problemas apontados na pesquisa, como longos intervalos entre os veículos e lotação, devem ser buscadas com auxílio das autoridades e participação da sociedade. Para a entidade, só com a priorização efetiva do transporte coletivo a situação poderá mudar. A federação garante que as empresas de ônibus vêm fazendo a sua parte, aumentando a oferta de veículos, mas lembra que essas medidas isoladamente não acabam com os congestionamentos.

Thursday, August 11, 2011

The Geopolitics of Brazil - StratFor

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The Geopolitics of Brazil: An Emergent Power's Struggle with Geography

July 14, 2011
Editor's Note: This is the 15th in a series of STRATFOR monographs on the geopolitics of countries influential in world affairs.
Related Special Topic Page
South America is a geographically challenging land mass. The bulk of its territory is located in the equatorial zone, making nearly all of the northern two-thirds of its territory tropical. Jungle territory is the most difficult sort of biome to adapt for human economic activity. Clearing the land alone carries onerous costs. Soils are poor. Diseases run rampant. The climate is often too humid to allow grains to ripen. Even where rivers are navigable, often their banks are too muddy for construction, as with the Amazon.
As the tropics dominate South America, the continent's economic and political history has been problematic. Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana are fully within the tropical zone, and as such always have faced difficulties in achieving economic and political stability, though the discovery of oil in Venezuela improved that country's economic trajectory. Throughout the tropical zones nearly all of the population lives within a few dozen kilometers of the coast. For the most part, however, those coasts are not naturally sculpted to encourage interaction with the outside world. Natural ports — deepwater or otherwise — are few and far between.
There are, however, two geographic features on the continent that break this tropical monotony.
The first is the Andean mountain chain. The Andes run along the continent's western edge, giving rise to a handful of littoral and transmountain cultures physically separated from the continent's eastern bulk and thus largely left to develop according to their own devices. Colombia and Ecuador straddle the tropics and the Andes, with their economic cores not being coastal, but instead elevated in the somewhat cooler and dryer Andean valleys, which mitigates the difficulties of the tropics somewhat. Farther south are the arid transmountain states of Peru and Bolivia. Peru has achieved some degree of wealth by largely ignoring its own interior except when seeking resource extraction opportunities, instead concentrating its scant capital on the de facto city-state of Lima. In contrast, landlocked Bolivia is trapped in a perennial struggle between the poor highlanders of the Altiplano and the agriculturally rich region of the lowland Medialuna.
The combination of mountains and jungle greatly limits the degree to which states in this arc— from French Guiana in the northeast to Bolivia in the southwest —can integrate with each other or the outside world. In all cases, basic transport is extremely difficult; tropical diseases are often a serious issue; there are few good ports; agricultural development is both more labor and capital intensive compared to more traditional food-producing regions; humidity and heat hinder conventional grain production; and the ruggedness of the mountains raises the costs of everything.
Historically, the only way these states have achieved progress toward economic development is by accepting dependence on an external (and usually extraregional) power willing to provide investment capital. Without this, these states simply lack the capital generation capacity to meet their unique and staggering infrastructure challenges. Consequently, the broader region is severely underdeveloped, and the residents of most of these states are generally quite poor. While some may be able to achieve relative wealth under the right mix of circumstances, none has the ability to be a significant regional — much less global —power.
The second exception to the tropical dominance of South America is the temperate lands of the Southern Cone. Here, the summers are dry enough to allow traditional grains to ripen, while cooler weather — especially winter insect kills —limits the impact of disease outbreaks. Unlike the scattered populations of the Andean region, the Southern Cone is one large stretch of mostly flat, moderately watered territory. The bulk of that land lies in Argentina, with significantly smaller pieces in Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil. The only remaining country on the continent is where the temperate Southern Cone overlaps with the Andean mountain zone: Chile, one of the world's most physically isolated states. It takes longer to fly from Santiago to Lima than it does to fly from London to Moscow, and longer to sail from Santiago to Buenos Aires than it does from New York City to London. Chile consequently does not participate significantly in the politics of the Southern Cone.
In stark contrast to the mountains and jungle that dominate the majority of South America, the Southern Cone flatlands are the best land on the continent. Their flatness, combined with their natural prairies, lowers the cost of construction, and the temperate climate makes them rich agricultural zones. But the real advantage lies in the region's river structure. The Parana, Uruguay and Paraguay rivers combined with the Rio de la Plata — a massive estuary that empties into the Atlantic between contemporary Buenos Aires and Montevideo — are all navigable for a great portion of their length.
Moving goods via water costs about 10 to 30 times less than moving the same goods by truck. Such riverine transport systems therefore generate massive amounts of capital with little difficulty compared to land-transport systems. Collectively, this river network overlaying the agricultural flatlands is known as the Rio de la Plata region.
These rivers are particularly valuable for agricultural regions such as the Rio de la Plata. Wheat, corn, soybeans and the like suffer from a weak value-to-bulk ratio— oftentimes transporting them great distances can only be done at an economic loss. Water transport allows for foodstuffs to cheaply and easily be brought not just downstream but to the ocean and then the wider world. Russia presents a strong contrast to the Rio de la Plata region. Its famines often directly result from the inability to bring foodstuffs to the cities efficiently because its navigable rivers are not well situated — meaning foodstuffs must be transported by truck or train.
The most important geographic fact on the continent is that the Rio de la Plata region's rivers are navigable both independently and collectively via a system of canals and locks. Only the Greater Mississippi River network of North America has more kilometers of interconnected maritime transport options. This interconnectivity allows greater economies of scale, greater volumes of capital generation and larger populations, and it greatly enhances the establishment of a single political authority. In contrast, the separate rivers of the North European Plain have given rise to multiple, often mutually hostile, nationalities. Argentina controls the mouth of the Rio de la Plata and the bulk of the navigable stretches of river. This leaves the Uruguayans, Paraguayans and Brazilians at a disadvantage within the region. (Brazilian power is greater overall than Argentine power, but not in the critical capital-generating geography of the Rio de la Plata region.)
The Brazilian Geography
Most of Brazil's territory does not lie within these Southern Cone lands. Instead, roughly one-third of Brazil's 8.5 million square kilometers is composed of vast tracts of challenging jungle, with the Amazon Basin being the most intractable of all. While there are many potential opportunities to exploit minerals, they come with daunting infrastructure costs.
South of the Amazon Basin lies a unique region known as the cerrado, a vast tropical savannah with extremely acidic soils. However, because the heat and humidity is far less intense than in the jungle, the cerrado can be made economically viable by brute force. The cost, however, is extreme. In addition to the massive infrastructure challenges — the cerrado lacks any navigable rivers— the land must in essence be terraformed for use: cleared, leveled and fertilized on an industrial scale to make it amenable to traditional crops. There is also the issue of distance. The cerrado is an inland region, so shipping any supplies to or produce from the region comes at a hefty transport cost. Brazil has spent the greater part of the past three generations engaged in precisely this sort of grand effort.
Luckily for the Brazilians, not all of Brazil's lands are so difficult. About 600,000 square kilometers of Brazil is considered traditionally arable. While this represents only 7 percent of the country's total land area, that still constitutes a piece of arable territory roughly the size of Texas or France. All of that land lies in the country's southern reaches. But much of that territory lies in the interior, where it is not easily accessible. Brazil's true core territories are less than one quarter of this 7 percent, about the size of Tunisia, straddling the area where the tropical zone gives way to the temperate lands of the Southern Cone. These areas formed the core of Brazil's original settlements in the early colonial period, and these lands formed the population core of Brazil for the first three centuries of its existence. As such, the topography of these lands has had an almost deterministic impact on Brazil's development. Understanding that topography and its legacy is central to understanding what is empowering Brazil to evolve — and hampering Brazil from evolving— into a major power in the years to come.
Two obvious characteristics stand out regarding this core Brazilian region. First, it is semi-tropical, so development in the region faces a somewhat less intense version of the challenges described above for fully tropical zones. Second, and more critical, the Brazilian interior is a raised plateau — called the Brazilian Shield — which directly abuts Brazil's Atlantic coast along nearly the entirety of the country's southeastern perimeter. The drop from the shield to the Atlantic is quite steep, with most of the coast appearing as a wall when viewed from the ocean — the source of the dramatic backdrops of most Brazilian coastal cities. This wall is called the Grand Escarpment, and most Brazilian cities in this core region— Rio de Janeiro, Vitoria, Santos and Porto Alegre — are located on small, isolated pockets of relatively flat land where the escarpment falls to the sea.
The primary problem this enclave topography presents is achieving economies of scale. In normal development patterns, cities form around some sort of core economic asset, typically a river's head of navigation (the maximum inland point that a sizable cargo vessel can reach) or a port or nexus of other transport options. The city then spreads out, typically growing along the transport corridors, reflecting that access to those transport corridors provides greater economic opportunities and lower economic costs. So long as somewhat flat land remains available, the city can continue growing at low cost. In time, nearby cities often start merging into each other, allowing them to share labor, capital, infrastructure and services. Economies of scale proliferate and such megacities begin generating massive amounts of capital and skilled labor from the synergies.
Megacities —such as New York City, Los Angeles, London, Paris, Tokyo, Buenos Aires, Istanbul and Shanghai — form the core of the global economic system. This "standard" development pattern has been repeated the world over. The premier American example is the "megalopolis" region of cities on the American Eastern Seaboard stretching from Washington to Boston, encompassing such major locations as Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Hartford and Providence. In Europe, a similar conglomeration contains the many cities of the German Rhine Valley. In both cases, major and minor cities alike merge into an urban/suburban conglomeration where the resources of each location are shared with and bolstered by the others. In all such cases, the common characteristic is the existence of land upon which to expand.
That land is precisely what Brazil's core territory lacks. The Grand Escarpment comes right down to the ocean throughout the Brazilian southern coast. Brazil's cities, therefore, are forced to develop on small enclaves of relatively flat land in the few areas where the escarpment has not pushed all the way to the sea. The lack of a coastal plain means no small cities can form between the major cities. Any infrastructure built by one city never serves another city, and linking the cities requires climbing up the escarpment onto the shield itself, traversing the shield and then going back down the escarpment to the other cities, a difficult and costly endeavor in terms of both time and engineering. Because Brazil does not have direct access to the navigable rivers of the Rio de la Plata region, it has to scrounge for capital to apply to this capital-intensive project. Absolute limitations on land area also drive up the cost of that land, injecting strong inflation into the mix right at the beginning and raising development costs. Enclavic geography is not something that can be "grown out of" or "developed around." The topography is constant, and these cities simply cannot synergize each other — a modern, low capital-cost city cannot be built on the side of a cliff. Moreover, since these enclaves are Brazil's primary points of interaction with the outside world, they represent a constant, permanent restriction on Brazil's ability to grow.
To this day, Brazil has very few major highways and railways because even where the topography does allow for the possibility, the costs still are much higher than in flatter lands farther south. The country lacks a major coastal road system, as the escarpment is simply too steep and too close to the coast. Following the Brazilian coastline makes clear how Brazil's coastal roads are almost exclusively two-lane, and the coastal cities — while dramatic — are tiny and crammed into whatever pockets of land they can find. And most of the country is still without a rail network; much of that soy, corn and rice that the country has become famous for exporting reaches the country's ports by truck, the most expensive way to transport bulk goods.
STRATFOR photo
The Grand Escarpment drops almost directly down to the coast in most portions of southern Brazil. This photograph vividly illustrates how the Grand Escarpment starkly limits Rio de Janeiro's development. Brazil's southern coastal cities have developed along similar patterns, lacking the traditional hinterlands of major cities elsewhere in the world.
The one exception to the rule is Sao Paulo state, centered on the city of the same name. Only Sao Paulo has sufficient flat lands to follow a more standard development pattern and thus achieve any economies of scale. It is also the only portion of Brazil that possesses anything resembling the modern, integrated infrastructure that follows more traditional development patterns. Unsurprisingly, this single state accounts for more than one-third of Brazil's gross domestic product (GDP) despite only serving as home to one-fifth of the country's population. As recently as 1950, Sao Paulo state produced more than one-half Brazil's economic output.
Unfortunately, Sao Paulo is not a coastal city. The escarpment at Sao Paulo is too steep and the coastal enclave — the port of Santos — is too small to take full advantage of Sao Paulo's potential. Sao Paulo sits at an elevation of about 800 meters atop the Brazilian Shield, some 70 kilometers inland. (In comparison, the U.S. city at the Mississippi River's head of navigation, Minneapolis, Minn., sits at less than 200 meters elevation despite being 3,000 kilometers inland.) This sharp elevation change helps mitigate the climatic impact of the region's near-tropical conditions that predominate on the coast, but comes at the dauntingly high capital and engineering costs required to link the city and state to the coast. So while Sao Paulo is indeed a major economic center, it is not one deeply hardwired into Brazil's coastal cities or to the world at large.
The lack of economies of scale and the difficulty of integrating local infrastructure forces bottlenecks. The worst of those bottlenecks occur where the coastal enclaves interact with the outside world — in Brazil's ports — and it is here that Brazil faces the biggest limiting factor in achieving economic breakout. Brazil is correctly thought of as amajor exporter of any number of raw commodities, but the hostility of its geography to shipping and the inability of its cities to integrate have curtailed port development drastically. The top seven Brazilian ports combined have less loading capacity than the top U.S. port, New Orleans, and all Brazilian ports combined have considerably less loading capacity than the top two U.S. ports, New Orleans and Houston.
Building a more sustainable Brazil cannot be done on the coast; there simply is not enough land there to feed a growing nation. But climbing up the Grand Escarpment to develop the interior introduces a new problem.
The coastal ridge at the top of the Grand Escarpment also divides drainage basins. Within a few dozen kilometers of the southeastern coast, South American rivers flow west, not east, ultimately emptying into the Rio de la Plata network. As the early Brazilian cities attempted to develop interior hinterlands, those hinterlands found themselves more economically intertwined with Argentine and Paraguayan lands to the south than with their parent communities to the east. For many in the interior it was cheaper, easier and faster to float products down the rivers to the megaport of Buenos Aires than to lug them by land up and over the Brazilian coastal mountain ranges and down the Grand Escarpment to the middling disconnected ports of coastal Brazil. Similarly, it was far easier to sail down the Atlantic coast and up the Rio de la Plata Basin onto the Parana than expend the cost of building on-land infrastructure. Brazil's early efforts to develop integration within its own territories paradoxically led to an economic dependence upon its southern neighbors that weakened intra-Brazilian relationships.
Those southern neighbors took advantage of this situation, leaving Brazil struggling to control its own land. Unlike the U.S. independence experience, in which all of the colonies were part of the same administration and battled as one against their colonial overlord, South America was a patchwork of different entities, all of which fought for their independence in the same 15-year period. Paraguay achieved independence in 1811, Argentina in 1818 and Brazil in 1823. Immediately upon independence, the region's new states struggled for control of the waterways that held the key to being the dominant, integrated economic power of the Southern Cone. Since Brazil was the last of the region's states to break away from its former colonial master, it had the least time to consolidate in preparation for post-independence wars, and its enclave nature made such consolidation far more challenging than that of other Southern Cone states. Brazil accordingly did very badly in the ensuing conflicts.
Those early wars resulted in Uruguay's separation from Brazil and the removal of Brazilian authority to above the heads-of-navigation on all of the Rio de la Plata region's rivers. All of the rivers' navigable lengths were now shared between Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, leaving capital-poor Brazil sequestered in its highland semi-tropical territories. Argentina and Paraguay rose rapidly in economic and military might, while Brazil languished with little more than plantation agriculture for more than a century.
The next two generations of regional competition focused on Argentina and Paraguay, which struggled for control of the Rio de la Plata maritime system. That competition came to a head in the 1864-1870 War of the Triple Alliance in which Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay eventually won after a brutal struggle with Paraguay. Fully 90 percent of the male Paraguayan population died in the conflict, nearly destroying Paraguay as a country; its demography did not finally rebalance until the 1990s. With Brazil's wings clipped and its more serious regional rival all but destroyed, Argentina fashioned Paraguay and Uruguay into economic satellites, leveraging the region's river systems to become a global economic power. By 1929 it had the world's fourth-highest per capita GDP. Brazil, in contrast, remained impoverished and relatively isolated for decades.
Nor was Brazil united. Between the economic pull of Argentina and its rivers and the disconnected nature of the enclavic coast, regionalism became a major feature of Brazilian politics. Contact between the various pieces of Brazil was difficult, while contact with the outside world was relatively easy, making integration of all kinds — political, economic, and cultural —often elusive.
Regionalism remains a major issue in Brazilian politics, with strong rivalries triggering divisions among states and between states and the federal government. The preponderance of power at the beginning of the 20th century lay in the hands of the wealthier states, Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo. For many years, control of the central government alternated between the two states. This left Brazil's remaining states isolated politically, prodding them to seek economic opportunities globally while defining their identities locally. For the better part of a century, "Brazil" was less a national concept as much as it was a geographic concept. Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul states, for example, in many ways started acting like independent countries. This state of affairs lasted until very recently.
Brazil's Inflation Trap
Brazil's biggest problem — which began with the colonial settlement process and continues to the current day — is that it is simply not capable of growth that is both sustained and stable. Economic growth anywhere in the world is inflationary: Demand for arable land, labor, transport, capital and resources pushes the prices of all of these inputs up. Growth in most places can continue until those inflationary pressures build and eventually overtake any potential benefit of that growth. At that point, growth collapses due to higher costs and a recession sets in. Brazil's burden to bear is that land, labor, transport infrastructure and capital exist in such extreme scarcity in Brazil that any economic growth almost instantly turns inflationary. Arable land, transport infrastructure and capital have already been discussed, but labor requires a more thorough examination, particularly given contemporary Brazil's population of 194 million.
The labor issue is rooted in Brazil's oligarchic economic system, something that also has a geographic origin. Brazil suffers from low capital generation and high capital costs — the opposite of most of the world's economic power centers. In those power centers, the relative omnipresence of capital allows a democratization of economic power.
In the American experience, anyone could easily venture out of the cities into the lands of the Greater Mississippi Basin and, within a year or two, be exporting agricultural produce to both American and European cities. In Brazil, by contrast, massive amounts of capital were needed simply to build roads up the Grand Escarpment. The prospect of a common citizen establishing an independent economic existence in that sort of environment was unrealistic, as the only people who had the capacity to "build" Brazil were those who entered the country with their own pre-existing fortunes. So while the early American experience — and the industrialization that followed — was defined by immigrants from Europe's rural poor seeking land, Brazil was started on its path by rich Portuguese settlers who brought a portion of their fortunes with them.
The American culture of small businesses long predates independence, whereas its Brazilian equivalent did not take root until the immigration waves of the late 19th century. As could be expected in a location where capital was rare but the needs for capital were high, these oligarchs saw no reason to share what infrastructure they built with anyone — not even with each other.
Complicating matters was that early Brazil did not have full access to that France-sized piece of arable land — most of it lay in the interior on the wrong side of the Grand Escarpment. The tropical climate drastically limited agricultural options. Until the mid-20th century, the only crops that could be grown en masse were plantation crops, first and most famously sugar, but in time coffee, citrus, bananas and tobacco. But unlike more traditional cereal crops that only require a few weeks of attention per year, such tropical crops are far more labor intensive in their planting, tending, harvesting and transport. Tobacco had to be cut and dried; sugar had to be cut, cooked and refined. Whereas a grain field can be quickly harvested and dumped into a truck, harvesting and transporting bananas, for example, takes much longer.
These characteristics impacted Brazil in two critical ways.
First, the capital required for these plantations was so great that smallholders of the American model were largely shut out. No smallholders meant no small towns that could form kernels of education and industrialization. Instead, plantations meant company towns where economic oligarchies gave birth to political oligarchies. In time, the political and economic power imbalance would provide the foundation for the Brazilian military governments of the 20th century. Even in modern times, Brazil's geography continues to favor oligarchic plantation farming to family farming. At present, 85 percent of farms in the United States— a country with a reputation for factory farming — are 500 acres or fewer, whereas 70 percent of Brazilian farms are 500 acres or more.
Time has not moderated this trend, but rather deepened it. In the latter half of the 20th century, Brazil launched a massive agricultural diversification effort that included the clearing of vast swaths of land in the interior, some of it in the cerrado and some as far inland as the Bolivian border. Among other agricultural products, some of these new lands were appropriate for corn and soybeans, crops normally quite amenable to farmers of a more modest capital base. But the cerrado requires massive inputs before agriculture can be attempted, and the interior lands are often in excess of 1,000 kilometers from Brazil's perennially overworked ports. The twin development and infrastructure costs wound up reinforcing the oligarchic nature of the Brazilian agricultural system to the point that the average "new" Brazilian farm is six times the size of the farms of "old" Brazil.
Second, plantation agriculture calls for unskilled labor, a pattern that continues into the modern day. Unlike the more advanced New World colonies — which enjoyed access to easier transport and thus more capital, yielding the kernels of urbanization, an educational system and labor differentiation — Brazil relied on slave labor. It was the last country in the Western Hemisphere to outlaw slavery, a step it took in 1888.
A lack of skilled labor means, among other things, a smaller middle class and lower internal consumption than other states at a similar level of development. Consequently, Brazil has a small number of landed elite and a large majority of poor. As of 2011, fully one in four Brazilians eke out a living in Brazil's infamous slums, the favelas. According to the Gini coefficient, a sociological measure of income inequality, Brazil has been the most unequal of the world's major states for decades.
Taken together, Brazil faces inflationary barriers at every stage of the growth cycle. Starting a business requires capital, which is in short supply and held by a privileged class. Shipping goods requires scarce infrastructure, which is insufficient to needs, expensive and often owned by a privileged class. Any increase in demand for either of these inputs puts upward pressure on the associated costs. Expanding a business requires skilled labor, but there is not a deep skilled labor pool, so any hiring quickly results in wage spirals. And holding everything back is the still-disconnected nature of the Brazilian cities, so there are few economies of scale. More than anywhere else in the world, growth triggers inflation — which kills growth.
Consequently, Brazil has been characterized by below-average growth and above-average inflation for centuries and thus has traditionally been underindustrialized compared to most other developing states. Even before the oligarchs' interests are factored in, any infrastructure projects that make sense will be linked to projects with good foreign cash-generating potential, which quickly narrows the list of likely projects to agriculture and mining (all commodities are U.S.-dollar denominated).
As such, Brazil has had little choice but to focus on the production or extraction of primary commodities such as sugar and iron ore. Such capital-intensive industries not only reinforce the oligarchic system but also skew the economy's output. As of 2010, fully 70 percent of Brazil's exports are dollar-denominated, with 45 percent of exports by value consisting of raw commodities. This may help Brazil's (dollar-denominated) bottom line, but it does nothing to address its chronic infrastructure, labor, inequality or inflationary restraints.
It is thus unsurprising that Brazil has not yet emerged as a major global power. It cannot economically expand without killing itself with inflation. Its skilled labor pool and capital markets are woefully insufficient for its needs, and the oligarchs have a vested interest in keeping things that way. Even efforts to expand out of the country's various traps have in many ways only entrenched the system. Moreover, what growth Brazil has enjoyed in recent years has been because of the combination of a broad rise in commodity prices and heavy foreign investment into Brazilian infrastructure to get at those commodities, not because of anything Brazil has done.
This hardly means that Brazil is either a failed state or that its past is condemned to be its future. What this does mean is that if Brazil is to rise as a major power something has to change. And two things have changed, in fact: Argentina, and the way Brazilians view their country.
Modern Argentina's Decline
Argentina has everything necessary to become a major global power. Its lands are flat and temperate, its rivers are navigable and interconnected, and it enjoys the buffer of distance from major competitors and ample resources to fuel a rise to greatness. Indeed, throughout its first century of independence, Argentina moved from victory to victory — first over Brazil, then Paraguay, and then into the ranks of the world's richest states. Standing in Argentina's shadow, it is no surprise that Brazilians developed the tendency to be humble and passive, unwilling to challenge their rich and dynamic southern neighbor.
In the aftermath of the War of the Triple Alliance, Argentina enjoyed a historic boom. European immigrants arrived en masse, and the opportunities of the Rio de la Plata allowed for the creation and metabolization of massive amounts of capital. Alone among the Latin American states, Argentina generated a substantial middle class. But Argentina had two weaknesses, and from roughly 1930 on, Argentina's trajectory has been downward.
First, unlike in Anglo America, land in Argentina was not widely distributed to individual landholders. Like elsewhere in Latin America, Argentina began with an oligarchic landholder system that left most of the population economically dependent on a small, wealthy elite. A successful backlash to this autocratic structure came in the form of labor unrest that propelled the populist Peron regime to power.
The legacy of Peronism is the enhancement of autocratic power by political mobilization of the lower and middle classes. This power has remained consolidated under the control of a leader whose authority is unquestioned and whose influence over the institutions of the state is near total. Other institutions are much weaker than the presidency, and as a result, policymaking in Argentina is highly dependent on the individual in power at any given time. Populist demands have overpowered more conventional policies for decades on end, resulting in Argentina's slow and irregular decline for nearly a century.
Second, the vast distance of Argentina from the rest of the world greatly shaped Argentine perceptions. Tucked away at the bottom of the Atlantic, Argentina is one of the world's most sequestered states. Once Brazil and Paraguay had been contained as local threats, the next closest threat to Argentina was the United Kingdom, some 12,000 kilometers away. As in the United States, such large distances allowed a large degree of cultural insulation and national savings. (There was no need to maintain a large standing military.)
But there is a critical difference between the two experiences. The Americans were some 7,000 kilometers closer to potential rivals and thus on occasion were reminded that they are not, in fact, alone. Events such as the 1814 burning of Washington, the European willingness to ignore the Union blockade during the Civil War, the 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor and, most recently, 9/11 unsurprisingly have had a major impact on the American psyche. Each shocked the Americans out of complacency and spurred them to overreact to the sudden "surprise" that the rest of the world exists. In those subsequent spasms of activity, the Americans remake themselves. This process entails a great deal of disruption in the United States and abroad, but it keeps the Americans adaptable.
Argentina's greater distance from world affairs means that they have suffered no such revivals following intrusions into their geographic utopia. The War of the Triple Alliance is now 140 years past. The war over the Falklands Islands, known to Argentines as the Malvinas, was the one notable instance in which Argentina sought interaction with the outside world. Buenos Aires initiated conflict with a far superior military power — the United Kingdom — and the resulting political and military defeat crushed the standing of the Argentine military, heavily contributing to the decline and fall of the military government. Although the Falklands War had a huge political impact, it did not pose the kind of challenge to Argentine core elements of prosperity that would require a concerted effort at reform and self-renewal. As a result, Argentina has neglected to address national problems that have crept up on it over the decades.
Recent developments underline this tendency. An economic crisis in 2001-2002 placed a new populist government in power that defaulted on the country's debt, which freed Buenos Aires of the need to make interest payments. Rather than seize the opportunity to rebalance the Argentine economic and political system onto a sounder footing that leveraged the country's geographic blessings, the state instead spent the savings on mass subsidies to bolster its populist credentials. High growth resulted, but the policies were only paid for by hollowing out the country's capital stock and distorting the economy to the point where fundamental industries — from cattle farming to wheat growing to energy production — have now begun to fail. High taxes combined with high consumption encouraged by large subsidies and price controls have crippled business owners and agriculturalists alike. The subsidies have proved particularly problematic, as they have locked the government into ever-increasing expenditures expressly linked to the populist patronage the people demand as their right. Consequently, Buenos Aires only wields limited influence in South America and little to none beyond the continent.
With all that said, Argentina is still the power in South America with the clearest, most likely growth path. It still holds the Rio de la Plata's river network and it still holds the Pampas, the best farmland in the Southern Hemisphere. What it cannot seem to figure out is how to make use of its favorable position. So long as that remains the case — so long as the natural dominant power of the Southern Cone remains in decline — other powers have at least a chance to emerge. Which brings us back to Brazil.
Modern Brazil's Success
Brazil's challenges are legion, but at core they are as simple as these two issues: Brazil's geography works against it, and its economy is trapped by inflation. The Brazilians have spent decades struggling against these two facts, and in the past generation they have finally achieved significant progress.
Brazil's Struggle With Geography
As discussed, Brazil's core coastal territories present the country with a variety of difficulties that no amount of local development can overcome. Yet Brazil does sport a broad swath of arable land in its interior which is flatter, more temperate and largely unified topographically — the trick is uniting the coastal territories on the east side of the Grand Escarpment with the interior in a way that does not undermine the authority of the state. From the 1870s until the 1980s Brazilian development strategy therefore was relatively straightforward: expand the country's infrastructure, kilometer by painstaking kilometer, into those interior arable zones. The sheer size of the territories that could be put under plow partially overcame the inflationary and transport bottlenecks that limited Brazil's core coastal regions.
While early expansion certainly weakened central authority by encouraging economic links to Argentina, as that expansion built upon itself and developed economies of scale, interior Brazil became a formidable economic engine in and of itself. And while Brazil's gaze still lingered on the attractiveness of the Rio de la Plata's transport network, Brazil was sizable enough to have independent economic heft. Under those circumstances, association with coastal Brazil was an economic complication rather than an economic catastrophe.
By the 1970s several interlocking factors started solidifying the many interior success stories:
  • Argentina's deepening malaise lessened the attractiveness of the Rio de la Plata's rivers.
  • Brazil finally cleared enough interior lands so that more easily shippable conventional cereals were starting to be produced in large quantities, producing a more positive value-bulk ratio in the transport of Brazilian agricultural produce that somewhat eased its transport problem.
  • Brazil's interior expansion took it right up to the borders of Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, and after some tentative moments, Brazilian infrastructure and capital started moving across the borders and integrating the agricultural lands of the border states into the broader Brazilian economy. Argentina did little to resist. Bit by bit Argentina lost influence in the three states and by 2011 all three have become de facto Brazilian economic satellites.
  • Foreign investors saw sufficient potential in the Brazilian interior that they were willing to invest increasing sums of their own capital in underwriting both the country's interior development projects and its efforts to assimilate the three border states.
Surprisingly, the clear-cutting of the interior provided the basis of Brazilian political liberalization. One of the many downsides of an oligarchic economic system is that politics tend to become as concentrated as wealth. Yet in clearing the land Brazil created artificial trade ways — roads — that allowed some Brazilians to strike out on their own (though they were not as efficient as rivers). Currently there are some 2.6 million landholders with farms of between 5 and 100 acres (anything less is a subsistence farm, while anything more verges into the category of high-capital factory farms). That is 2.6 million families who have a somewhat independent economic — and political— existence. Elsewhere in the world, that is known as a middle class. The environmental price was steep, but without this very new class of landholder, Brazilian democracy would be on fairly shaky ground.
The interior expansion effort solved none of the coastal bottleneck issues, but the constellation of forces certainly conspired to ease Brazil's path. But perhaps the most important aspect of this interior push was that Brazil ceased to be simply a geographic concept. The rising importance of the interior — best symbolized by the relocation of the political capital to the interior city of Brasilia in 1960 — diluted the regional leanings of the coastal cities. The lands of the interior saw themselves first and foremost as Brazilian, and as that identity slowly gained credence, the government finally achieved sufficient gravitas and respect to begin addressing the country's other major challenge.
Inflation
No economic strategy can allow Brazil to achieve the magic mix of locally determined, strong growth with low inflation. At most, Brazil can have two of the three. For most of the 20th century, Brazilian governments tended to favor growth as a means of containing social unrest and mustering resources for the government, even at the cost of inflation. But since inflation tends disproportionately to harm the poor, the already-wide income gap between the oligarchs and the rest of the population only widened. Since 2006, strong global commodity prices have allowed the Brazilian economy to grow fairly rapidly, but those commodity prices are based on factors wholly beyond Brazil's control. As with every other commodity cycle, this one, too, will come to an end, triggering all the economic dislocation with which Brazilians are all too familiar.
Unless of course, the government changes the game — which it has done.
The macroeconomic strategy of the current regime, along with that of a string of governments going back to the early 1990s, is known colloquially as the "real plan" (after Brazil's currency, the real). In essence, the strategy turned Brazil's traditional strategy of growth at any cost on its head, seeking instead low inflation at any cost. Subsidies were eliminated wholesale across the economy, working from the understanding that consumption triggered inflation. Credit —whether government or private, domestic or foreign — was greatly restricted, working from the assumption that the Brazilian system could not handle the subsequent growth without stoking inflation. Government spending was greatly reduced and deficit spending largely phased out on the understanding that all forms of stimulus should be minimized to avoid inflation.
In practice, this led to a series of policies that most economists interpreted as rather orthodox, consisting of extremely low government debt; extremely restrained government activity; and extremely well capitalized, heavily regulated and conservative banks. These strict inflation control policies have achieved a high degree of economic stability. Inflation plunged from more than 2,000 percent a year to the single digits. But those gains came at a cost: Between 1980 and 2005, Brazil has shifted from one of the world's fastest growing economies with one of the highest inflation rates to one of the lowest inflation economies with one of the lowest (if somewhat irregular) growth rates.
But the real plan is not an orthodox economic policy. Economic orthodoxy stems from the belief that constrained credit, limited government and low inflation are policy tools designed to maximize growth. Orthodox policies are means to an end. The real plan approaches the question from the other side, in which strong growth is the enemy because it causes runaway inflation that destroys economic, political and social stability. As such, constrained credit, limited government and low inflation are the goals of the real plan, not the means. The distinction is sufficiently critical to bear repeating: Growth is the enemy of the real plan, not its goal.
What results is not so much a difference between perception and reality but between what the Brazilian government intended and what the international markets perceive those intentions to be. Investors across the world believe the real plan's ends are in actuality its means — and they interpret those ends as being in perfect sync with their interests. Thus, foreign investors have been voting for Brazil and the real plan with their money. Inward investment to Brazil is at historical highs, with the Brazilian Central Bank projecting the country's 2011 foreign direct investment take at a stunning $60 billion.
All this money is working against the real plan's goals: introducing credit where the government seeks to constrain credit, overfunding banks that the government wants to keep tightly regulated, encouraging spending that the government deems dangerous. Brazilians may be feeling richer because of the cheap, imported credit, but for government planners the environment is becoming ever more dangerous, threatening the hard-won stability that the real plan seeks to sustain. At the time of this writing, annualized inflation has edged up to 6 percent, right at the government's redline.
The true success of the real plan lies in achieving economic stability and, most of all, control. Brazil's geographic and social challenges are daunting, and no government could hope to address them competently if it could not first master local macroeconomic forces. In this, the real plan has performed to design. While hardly dead, inflation is restrained — and that has given the government space to start addressing the myriad other issues the country faces.
As with the interior expansion plan, the success of the real plan has changed how Brazilians feel about their country. When inflation burned through poor citizens' savings, when it destroyed livelihoods and condemned tens of millions to lives of poverty, faith in central institutions was lacking. The real plan may not promise great growth or even great wealth, but it has delivered price stability — and with price stability people can lay at least a limited groundwork for their own futures. Savings holds value from year to year. Purchasing power is constant. These are basic economic factors that most of the developed world takes for granted but which are relatively new to the current generation of Brazilians— and Brazilians rightly credit their central government with achieving them.
Just as the interior expansion effort provided all of the Brazilian states with a vested political interest in the Brazil project, the real plan has provided all of the Brazilian states with a vested economic interest in the central government. It is not so much that the real plan removed the structural and geographic causes of Brazil's inflation problem — which is impossible to do — but it proved to Brazilians that their country could be economically stable and that their government could act in the interests of Brazil in its totality rather than simply for whichever state happened to hold the presidency at the time.
Brazil's Geopolitical Imperatives
Geopolitical imperatives are broad, strategic goals a country must pursue if it is to achieve security and success. These are non-ideological paths determined by the geography of a given country and by the geography of its neighbors. Geopolitical imperatives typically nest: The second imperative is dependent upon the first imperative, the third upon the second, and so on. This is not the case for Brazil, however.
Since Brazil occupies such a difficult geography, it has traditionally been a weak state that has lacked the resources and institutional capacity to greatly impact the world around it. Its first three imperatives reflect this. As such, the order in which those imperatives might be attained is largely determined by the constellation of forces in Brazil's near abroad — factors for the most part beyond the Brazilians' ability to manipulate — rather than any decision-making process in Brasilia. Brazil can only push to achieve these imperatives as circumstances beyond its control allow.
Imperative One: Protect the Coast
The Brazilian southern coast contains the country's core territories. However, the ruggedness of that coast and the disconnected enclave nature of the core territories mean that infrastructure linking the coastal territories will not ensure mutual defense. The only way Brazil can protect its core itself is to cultivate a naval force of sufficient strength to deter would-be predatory powers. Without such a navy, Brazil would shatter into a series of (most likely mutually hostile) city-states. And without a navy any Brazilian exports are utterly at the mercy of more maritime-oriented entities.
But Brazil is capital poor and cannot afford such a navy. Historically, this has led Brasilia to seek alliances with whatever the dominant Atlantic power has happened to be in order to hold the traditionally more powerful Argentina in check. In the first half of the 19th century, the Brazilians sought out a favorable relationship with the British. But the deeper expression of this imperative came from Brazil's enthusiastic embracing of the United States' Monroe Doctrine. Nearly alone among Western Hemispheric powers, Brazil expressed enthusiasm for the American neo-colonial policy of barring European states from the Western Hemisphere, largely because it could not stand up to those powers without assistance.
Even today, Brazil's navy is unable to patrol the Brazilian coastlinereliably beyond the Brazilian core territories. Thus, Brazil maintains close— if not exactly friendly — relations with the United States both to ensure that America never views Brazil as a state of concern and as a hedge against other potential threats.
Imperative Two: Selectively Expand into the Interior
Developing (or outsourcing) a navy is one means of protecting Brazil's core. Another is to expand that core into new areas not so exposed to a hostile navy. In this, Brazil faces several challenges. The coastal enclaves are not large enough to generate their own economies of scale, so reaching inland requires the expenditure of massive resources Brazil simply does not have. As such, Brazil's inland expansion has been halting, slow and piecemeal and driven by an often badly coordinated mix of government, oligarchic and foreign interests. The obvious target for this expansion is into the subtropical and temperate regions of the country's south, not the tropical zone of the north.
However, the farther these new territories are from the coast, the more integrated they will naturally become into the capital-rich lands of the Rio de la Plata region to the south. Ironically, in achieving strategic depth and a better economic position, Brazil risks its territory becoming more fully integrated into its neighbors, as opposed to the Brazilian core.
In this challenge, however, also lies an opportunity. When the economies and populations of Brazil's interior regions are small, they naturally gravitate toward Argentina's sphere of influence. But as they grow they eventually reach a critical mass in terms of influence, which brings us to the third imperative.
Imperative Three: Expand into the Rio de la Plata Region
The solution lies in increasing Brazilian influence to the south so that those territories ultimately answer to Brazilian economic and political decision-making. Like the first two imperatives, this requires decades of slow efforts to make any progress. It has only been in the past generation that Brazil has created enough capital to encroach into the Argentine-Brazilian buffer states of Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. Brazil has invested heavily into Bolivian energy and agriculture. Most Bolivian foodstuffs are now sold to or through Brazil to the outside world. Natural gas — responsible for by far the largest component of Bolivian state income— is under the direct management of Brazilian state-owned energy company Petroleos Brasileiros (Petrobras). In Paraguay, Brazilians have migrated in significant numbers and are the dominant investors in the economy —particularly in electricity, as the two are partners in the Itaipu Dam. Brazilian (and Argentine) cash fuels Uruguay's vibrant financial sector, and Brazilian-born Uruguayan citizens now own a majority of Uruguay's farmland.
The next logical question — something the normally nonconfrontational Brazilians are currently struggling with — is what to do once economic control has been seized but political control is not yet in place. Here the Brazilians come up against an odd cultural barrier: Nonconfrontation is hardwired into the Brazilian psyche. Even today, with the Brazilian economy growing and Argentina continuing to struggle, there exists a belief in government circles that Brazil needs to concentrate on striking an equilibrium with Argentina, with perhaps the inclusion of even Chile in a trilateral balance of power in the region (the Chileans for their part want little to do with the Southern Cone and even less to do with the Argentine-Brazilian balance of power).
For all practical purposes, Brazil has already secured dominance in the three buffer states— Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay are all but economic satellites of Brazil— but in light of Brazil's historically passive foreign policy these states rarely shirk from demanding better terms out of Brasilia. Uruguay charges steep fees on Brazilian cargo. Paraguay recently was able to triple the cost of electricity produced by the Itaipu Dam, Brazil's single-largest source of electricity, and routinely receives financial aid from Brazil and Mercosur. The Bolivian government regularly confronts Medialuna landowners who for all intents and purposes are fully integrated into the Brazilian economy, and it has not been shy about its attempts to nationalize energy assets owned by Brazilian interests. If Brazil is going to make its gains stick, at some point it will need to devise a strategy for formalizing its control of the buffer states. That means, among other things, learning to be less accommodating.
There also looms a much more significant — potentially bruising — competition. Brazil cannot be truly secure until at the very least it controls the northern shore of the Rio de la Plata. That requires significant penetration into Paraguay and de facto control of Uruguay and of select pieces of northern Argentina. Were that to happen, Brazil's interior would have direct access to one of the world's most capital-rich regions. The marriage of such capital generation capacity to Brazil's pre-existing bulk will instantly transform Brazil into a power with global potential.
But not before. Without these territories, the Southern Cone balance of power remains in place no matter how weak Argentina becomes. So long as Argentina can exercise functional independence, it persists as a possible direct threat to Brazil, constrains Brazil's ability to generate its own capital and exists as a potential ally of extraregional powers that might seek to limit Brazil's rise.
Imperative Four: Challenge the Dominant Atlantic Power
Should Brazil manage to consolidate control over the Rio de la Plata basin the game changes greatly. At this point Brazil is no longer a vulnerable, enclave-based state facing extreme challenges to its development. Instead, Brazil would control the majority of the continent and command broad swaths of easily developed arable land. Instead of cowering in fear of regional naval powers, it would be the dominant regional naval power. With that transformation, Brazil would not see extraregional navies as friends protecting it from Argentina but as enemies seeking to constrain its rise.
Obviously, this imperative will be well beyond Brazil's reach for many decades. Not only is Brazil's navy far smaller than that of states with one-third its population, it is nowhere close to commanding the Rio de la Plata region. Until that happens, Brazil has no choice but to align with whatever the Atlantic's dominant power happens to be. To do otherwise would risk the country's exports and its overall economic and political coherence.
Contemporary Challenges: Escaping the Trap
Contemporary Brazil faces three interlocking problems that pose severe structural challenges to all of the economic stability it improbably has attained: an overvalued currency, Mercosur and China.
As to currency, investor enthusiasm for Brazil's recent stability and theoretical growth prospects has flooded the country with external funding. In addition to complicating always-critical inflation concerns, all that capital is having a demonstrable impact on the Brazilian currency, pushing the real up by more than 50 percent in just the past two years, and doubling it since 2003.
For Brazil's commodity exports — all of which are dollar-denominated — this has no demonstrable impact, but for the country's industrial exports this currency appreciation is disastrous. Because Brazil's infrastructure is inadequate and the country is capital poor, Brazil produces very little that is high value-added; Such industries are the providence of capital-rich, low-transport-cost economies such as Germany and Japan. Instead, Brazil's predominantly low- and medium-value-added industries compete heavily on price. A 50 percent increase in the currency largely guts any price competitiveness enjoyed by Brazil's sheltered industries. The only Brazilian firms benefiting from the mix of impacts are those few high-skill firms that happen to price their products in U.S. dollars, most notably oil firm Petrobras and aerospace firm Embraer — which, while world class by any definition, are not representative of the broader Brazilian economic structure.
Second, Brazil has limited itself with the highly distorting and damaging trade network known as Mercosur. Recall that an oligarchy has long dominated the Brazilian economy, controlling most of the country's scarce capital and enjoying a privileged economic and political position. Unlike most trade agreements — which are negotiated by governments on behalf of the corporate world — Brazil's oligarchic background meant these oligarchs negotiated Mercosur on behalf of the Brazilian government.
This abnormal process radically changed the end result. A normal trade deal removes barriers to trade and exposes companies in all the affected countries to competition from each other. In Mercosur's case, the various Brazilian industrialists were able to block off entire swaths of the economy for themselves, largely eliminating foreign competition. As such, Brazil's industrial sector is shielded from competition with outside forces — and even from most other forces within Mercosur. Add in a 50 percent currency appreciation and Brazil's industrial base is now one of the world's least competitive.
Third, Brazil has allowed competition from the one power most capable of destroying that sheltered industrial base: China. Throughout the past decade, Brazilian governments have sought Chinese investment largely to help alleviate some of the country's transport bottlenecks. The Chinese, hungry for Brazilian resources, have happily complied. But that infrastructure development has come at the cost of granting Chinese firms Brazilian market access, and that access— and even the investment — is damaging the Brazilian system.
At its core it is a difference in development models. The Chinese system is based on ultraloose capital access aimed at maximizing employment and throughput, regardless of the impact on profitability and inflation — about as far as possible from the real plan. This has had a number of negative side effects on the Chinese system, but as regards Brazil, it has resulted in a flood of subsidized Chinese imports.
The China trap is catching Brazil in three ways. The first is direct competition for market share in Brazil. The Chinese yuan is de facto pegged to the dollar, so Brazilian goods are now even less competitive versus Chinese goods on the domestic market (even before one takes into account that Chinese goods are for all intents and purposes subsidized). Second, China is engaging in indirect competition for market share by shipping goods into Brazil via other Mercosur member states— a fact that has prompted Brazil to raise non-tariff barriers that penalize Mercosur partners in an effort to stem Chinese competition. Third, the Chinese are among those international investors whose cash is pushing the value of the real ever upward. With every dollar the Chinese invest into Brazilian commodity production, the real goes just a bit higher and Chinese goods edge out their Brazilian counterparts just a bit more.
Resisting these trends will require some clever and quick policymaking along with a remarkable amount of political bravery. For example, scrapping Mercosur and adopting free market policies would throw the Brazilian market open to global competition. That would decimate Brazil's inefficient industrial base in the short run with the expected knock-on impact on employment, making it a policy the oligarchic and powerful labor unions alike would oppose. But it is difficult to imagine Brazilian industry progressing past its current stunted level if it is not forced to play on a larger field, and weakening the hold of the oligarchs is now at least a century overdue. Two more years of a rising currency and an enervating Chinese relationship will surely destroy much of the progress the Brazilians have painstakingly made in recent decades.
The current president, Dilma Rousseff, is a non-charismatic, no-nonsense technocrat well known for demanding respect and results, a good person to have in office given the nature of Brazil's contemporary challenges. Success in any free market-oriented reforms would require brutal and rapid changes in Brazil's standard operating procedures — changes that would undoubtedly come with serious political risks. The alternative is to continue to pursue protectionist, defensive policies while allowing international forces to shape Brazil rather than Brazil developing the means to shape international forces. This could well be the path Brazil follows. After all, the damage being inflicted by Mercosur and the China relationship are direct outcomes of policies Brazil chose to follow, rather than anything produced by Brazil's geography.
We do not mean to belittle Brazilians' achievements to date. Taming their lands, taming inflation and crafting a series of economic sectors fully deserving of international acclaim are no small feats. But insufficient infrastructure, an ossified oligarchy, a shallow skilled labor pool and the looming question of Argentina continue to define the Brazilian position. The maintenance of that position remains largely beyond the control of the Brazilian government. The economy remains hooked on commodities whose prices are set far beyond the continent. Their ability to supply those commodities is largely dependent upon infrastructure in turn dependent upon foreign financing. Even Brazilian dominance of their southern tier is as much a result of what Argentina has done wrong as opposed to what Brazil has done right.
For Brazil to emerge as a significant extraregional power, Brazilians must first address a lengthy list of internal and regional issues. These include — but are hardly limited to — moving beyond their oligarchic economic system, ensuring that Argentina will never again threaten it and formalizing their dominant position in the border states of Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay. These cannot be accomplished easily, but doing so is the price Brazilians must pay if they are to be the masters of their own destiny rather than simply accepting an environment crafted by others.